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Minimum wage laws are one of the most common forms of labour market legislation 
used internationally. Such laws were first implemented in South Africa in 2001, with 
the mandated wage differing across sectors. However, existing research on this topic 
tends to analyse the law’s effects at a national level, which does not allow for 
geographical variation in effectiveness. The overall objective of this research is to 
estimate and compare the effect of minimum wages on employment and wages in 
three provinces in South Africa, following the Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet (2013) 
methodology. This study also considers the extent of compliance with the law. The 
provinces considered for analysis are KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and the Western 
Cape, which contain the largest urban centres and the bulk of economic activity in 
South Africa. The sectors which are included are domestic workers, retail and private 
security, all of which are predominately located in urban areas. The research shows 
that non-compliance within the security sector, across all three provinces are high, 
whereas, the non-compliance to the law for the retail and domestic sector, reduced 
substantially between the years of analysis. The results from the employment 
probability models showed that there was an overall decreased likelihood of 
employment in the domestic and security sectors, for all three provinces. KwaZulu-
Natal and Gauteng saw significant increases in real wages between periods, for the 
domestic sector. Western Cape retail workers felt an increase in real wages but a 
negative effect in KwaZulu-Natal. The security sector in KwaZulu-Natal faced higher 
real wages, whereas a lower wage effect was found in Gauteng. It is apparent from 
the estimated results that the law has different effects in different provinces, which 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Central to the entire discipline of labour economics is the concept of minimum wages 
and its relation to employment and poverty alleviation. The execution of the minimum 
wage policy is intended to safeguard low-paid workers, who generally earn lower 
than subsistence income. Minimum wages were first implemented in South Africa in 
2001, but unlike the single minimum wage that is in place in most countries, the 
minima differ by sector and area. A growing number of studies have sought to 
evaluate the effects of minimum wages on the South African labour market (Hertz, 
2005; Millea, 2012; Dinkelman and Ranchhod, 2012; Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet, 
2013). However, the nature of the South African labour market differs enormously 
across geographical areas, and thus it might also be expected that the extent of 
enforcement and compliance with the law, and the effects on employment and 
working conditions, might differ by region. The goal of this dissertation is therefore to 
evaluate the effects of minimum wages across three provinces that comprise the 
bulk of South Africa’s economic activity, but that have different political, demographic 
and economic structures. 
The announcement of sectoral determinations, which set out specific minimum wage 
for eleven particular sectors, was brought about in 2002 by the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act (BCEA). The majority of the covered sectors are characterized as 
low-paid and employees who have attained low levels of education and therefore are 
living in poverty, and include farm workers, taxi operators, forestry workers,  
domestic workers, security workers and retail workers.  
There exists an extensive literature on minimum wage effects in South Africa, but 
most studies have been conducted either on an economy-wide level or within a 
particular district council. Additionally, there exists a large body of studies which 
evaluate the law in several sectors or in an individual sector. This leaves a gap in the 
field of study for a provincial comparison of the effects of the law, in sectors in which 
people are predominately employed in these geographical areas. This study thus 
aims to investigate one aspect of the effectiveness of minimum wage laws, by 
comparing how the laws have affected employment and wages in South Africa’s 
three largest provinces.  
Page 2 of 98 
 
Additionally, compliance with the minimum wage laws by employers will be 
estimated in order to deduce whether or not the law is effectively monitored and 
implemented. Many studies assume that employers comply with the law; however, in 
most developing countries, this assumption has been shown to be false (Ronconi, 
2010). The main reason for low compliance is a lack of incentives for employers to 
comply. Rational employers choose to obey the law based on their assumptions 
about the probability of being caught and the monetary value of the penalty 
(Ronconi, 2010). Geographic variation in violations and compliance can be explained 
by the varying number of inspectors in a province as well as spatial differences 
between sectors of analysis (Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet, 2012a). Furthermore, since 
each province is governed by its own provincial government, political priorities and 
efficiencies will directly impact the amount of enforcement of the law. 
The overall objective of the research is therefore to estimate the effect of minimum 
wages on employment status and reported wages in three provinces of South Africa, 
whilst considering compliance issues within sectors and provinces. The provinces 
considered for analysis are KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and the Western Cape, which 
contain the largest urban centres and the bulk of economic activity in South Africa. 
The sectors which are included are domestic workers, retail and private security, all 
of which are predominately located in urban areas. 
The following questions are intended to be answered through this research: 
1. How does compliance with minimum wage legislation within affected sectors 
differ between provinces? 
2. Do minimum wages affect the provincial probability of employment in the 
sectors in which they are implemented? 
3. Does the minimum wage law affect the wages earned in each sector, and how 
does this differ between provinces? 
The remainder of the dissertation is set out in the following way. Chapter 2 contains 
a literature review, which begins with a brief history and theoretical frameworks 
regarding minimum wages in the labour market. Next, previous studies conducted in 
developed and developing countries are reviewed. Thereafter the theoretical 
background of compliance with minimum wage laws, and a brief literature review of 
the extent of compliance, is presented. In chapter 3, the Labour Force Survey data 
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used in the study are described in detail, followed by a motivation of why the study 
uses KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and Western Cape as the areas of focus. A brief 
description of the sectors of study, analysis of employment characteristics and the 
respective control groups are outlined. Chapter 4 forms the bulk of the empirical 
analysis of the dissertation. It first provides descriptive statistics for workers in each 
province. The chapter goes on to outline the method of assessing compliance 
issues, and provide results by province and sector. Finally, the econometric models 
for employment and wage effects are estimated and discussed. Chapter 5 concludes 
by providing an overall summary of the research and stating the significance of the 
study. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Developing countries which adopt policies to regulate their labour markets have 
gained a great amount of attention in recent decades. Rigid labour markets in these 
countries, which implement strict labour policies, are widely believed to cause 
unemployment (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). The objective of this chapter is to 
achieve an understanding of the connection between the minimum wage policy and 
the labour market responses.  
The chapter begins by providing a brief description of the history of minimum wage 
laws, and the overall workings of the minimum wage laws in South Africa. 
Thereafter, this chapter relates labour economic theory to the implementation of the 
minimum wage law. Section 2.2 outlines how the effect of the minimum wage law is 
largely dependent on the labour market characteristics in which it is implemented in 
(Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). The standard perfectly competitive labour market 
model is described first, which then leads to a model that combines covered and 
uncovered sectors. Thereafter, an alternative model of a monopsonistic labour 
market is explained in terms of the minimum wage effects. The hypothetical results 
of the minimum wage law may be supported or contradicted by empirical research. 
The results of key studies in this literature are reviewed in section 2.3. Thereafter, 
compliance with the law is presented first as theory in 2.4 and is followed by a review 
of the minimum wage compliance studies in 2.5. Finally, section 2.6 concludes the 
chapter. 
2.1 Minimum wage laws 
The birth of minimum wage considerations was brought about primarily by the 
Industrial Revolution, which substantially changed the nature of the world economy. 
The conversion of agricultural activities to manufacturing and industrial development 
led to the rapid growth of economies, and hence a greater level of living standards. 
However, this also brought along with it income inequality and increased costs of 
living. Development economists put forward that the fast pace of industrialization 
increased pressure on firms to reinvest earnings which resulted in wages being 
lowered. This led to problems of increased wage inequality and increased levels of 
poverty. In order to ensure a minimum living standard and to suppress pressure from 
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trade unions, minimum wage laws were first implemented in New Zealand (1894), 
Australia (1896), U.K (1909) and U.S (1912) (Belser, 2013).   
There are several reasons as to why many policy makers advocate the 
implementation of minimum wage laws. The goal of the law is to help the poorest 
groups of society as it prevents this vulnerable group from labour exploitation. 
Macroeconomic support for the law comes from the fact that such laws should 
reduce government expenditure on welfare programs since the poorest are 
supplemented with higher incomes from work (Bakshi, 2015). Conversely, many 
economists have emphasized the existence of weaknesses of this type of legislation. 
Increases in wages may result in a decrease in labour demand, or a decrease in the 
employment rate. This imposes a contradiction to the main goal of the law as it may 
further harm the poorest and/or the least productive individuals. Firms facing the 
minimum wage law, if previous wages were below the minimum, will ultimately face 
larger costs of labour, and hence, a fall in profits. In response, producers may raise 
prices which may lead to inflation in a country (Bakshi, 2015).  
The current challenges faced by the South African economy, such as poverty and 
unemployment, are deeply rooted in the Apartheid regime. Under this system, the 
South African economy was largely supported by the racist state and promotion of 
large businesses. The economy was primarily dependent on cheap Black labour and 
the restriction of the abundant Black labourers to own land and receive income in 
other ways.  The minimum wage law, in particular, is supported on the basis that the 
‘apartheid wage’ has persisted in the newly democratic country. Furthermore, the 
pronounced trade union movement in the country, post-apartheid, led to the strong 
pursuit of the law. This policy is used as a tool to reduce income inequality and 
potentially decrease the number of people who are in poverty (Rethink Africa/South 
Africa Network on Inequality, 2014). 
In the South African economy, there exist eleven sectors which are identified as 
vulnerable and are protected, to an extent, via the minimum wage law. These 
sectors are Forestry, Agriculture, Contract Cleaning, Children in the Performance of 
Advertising, Artistic and Cultural Activities, Taxi Operators, Civil Engineering, 
Learnerships, Private Security, Domestic Workers, Wholesale and Retail, and 
Hospitality. Within a sector, wages are differentiated by occupation type, location and 
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hours worked. A policy paper, ‘Sectoral Determination’ sets out specific conditions 
for employers and employees in the covered sectors. The minimum wage laws are 
adjusted for inflation through the government gazettes (DPRU, 2008). 
The Department of Labour (DoL) is a state body that is responsible for matters 
relating to employment and labour (ILO, 2016). The DoL, in 1998, replaced the 
Wage Board with The Employment Conditions Commission (ECC) due to the 
announcement of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, No 75 of 1997 (BCEA) 
(DoL, 2003). There are four branches that serve the DoL, among which is the 
Service Delivery Branch which is then separated into Directorates. The Directorate of 
Inspection and Enforcement Services (IES) is accountable for assessments of 
compliance with labour regulations, defending vulnerable employees, supporting 
equity and skills training at their place of work and for Sector and Hazard Specific 
Advocacy. (ILO, 2016).  The mandate for inspectors in the IES is to investigate areas 
of work to ensure labour legislations are enforced; employees are compliant with the 
laws and promote good labour practices. Inspectors are also authorised to provide 
education of labour regulations and advisory services (DoL, 2011). 
Labour inspectors are authorised to conduct either a proactive or re-active 
inspection. There are also blitz inspections which occur predominantly in sectors that 
have worrying Injury on Duty statistics. Re-active inspections are conducted on the 
basis of minimum wage violations which are prompted by complaints from workers. 
The inspector will start the investigation which contains several steps. First, an 
inspection will be conducted and if the employer is found to be in violation of the 
minimum wage law, the inspector will issue a written undertaking. The employer then 
has 21 days to comply with the terms of the undertaking and a follow-up inspection is 
done. A compliance issue is ordered if the employer is still non-compliant with the 
law and is given 21 days to adhere to the terms of the compliance order. After 21 
days, if the employer still has not adhered to the laws, the inspector will follow 
relevant legal procedures to present the case to the Labour Court (Bhorat et al., 
2012b).   
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2.2 Economic theory of minimum wages  
The minimum wage can be regarded as a price floor. It is the legal lowest wage an 
employer is mandated to pay employees, in sectors in which the minimum wage law 
is applied. The textbook model of a perfectly competitive labour market in a sector 
that is covered by the minimum wage law is depicted using a simple labour supply 
and demand graph, which plots wages against the quantity of labour. Using Figure 
2.1 below, in a covered sector, the labour supply curve depicts the labour market 
participants according to their reservation wage. The demand for labour curve 
depicts the employer’s willingness to remunerate a worker. The equilibrium wage will 
occur when the demand and supply curve intersect at W*and equilibrium 
employment occurs at E*.In the textbook context, it is assumed that the minimum 
wage set by governments is above equilibrium wage, as labelled, which results in an 
increase in the quantity of labour supplied (E2), but a decline in the quantity 
demanded (E1) (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). 
Figure 2.1 Minimum wages in a covered, perfectly competitive market 
 
Source: Adapted from Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004, pp.719) 
As a result, classical unemployment (the difference between E1 and E2) occurs and 
re-employment of these workers, in this sector, can only occur if there is a fall in 
minimum wages (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). 
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The previous figure depicts the law’s effect in a covered sector. This means that the 
sector is required to adhere to the law. As shown, unemployment may be a result of 
the law, and this would lead to those that have been dismissed to seek employment 
elsewhere. Employment opportunities may possibly be found in uncovered sectors of 
the economy. These uncovered sectors are unaffected by the law and so they are 
allowed to set wages according to the equilibrium of the amount of labour supplied 
and demanded. The amount of labour supply in uncovered sectors may increase as 
a result of the movement of the unemployed (from the covered sector) to the 
uncovered sector. This potential spill-over effect forms the basis of the Welch-
Gramlich-Mincer two sector model. Figure 2.2, below, shows the rightward shift of 
the labour supply curve (from LS1 to LS2) as a result of the increase in the number of 
workers willing to be employed at every wage. The equilibrium wage then falls from 
w1 to w2 to adjust for the increase in labour supply. This lower wage creates an 
incentive for employers to increase employment (between E1 and E2). However, the 
number of workers that are employed in the uncovered sector is dependent on the 
elasticity of demand for labour in the two sectors. If demand for labour in the 
uncovered sector is elastic relative to a less elastic labour demand in the covered 
sector, then all unemployed (from the covered sector) individuals will be employed in 
the uncovered sector. In such a case, there will be no net unemployment created by 
the law. The only factor that would change is the wage, whereby the covered sector 
workers will receive higher wages and the uncovered workers will receive lower 
wages (Watchel, 1984). However, depending on the relative elasticities, it is also 
possible that net unemployment may result. 
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Figure 2.2 Uncovered perfectly competitive market effects of minimum wage 
 
Source:  Adapted from Watchel (1984, pp.464) 
A negative employment effect can be seen for the matching model, when wages are 
negotiated between employer and employees. If the negotiated wage (w*) is lower 
than the minimum wage, unemployment occurs, using Figure 2.1. The only 
difference between the matching model and the perfectly competitive model is that, 
in the former, the minimum is compared to the negotiated wage and the latter; 
minimum wage is compared to the competitive equilibrium wage (Cahuc and 
Zylberberg, 2004). 
Overall, negative employment effects are noticeable when using the perfectly 
competitive model of the labour market and the matching model to assess the 
minimum wage law. The next model provides a contrast to these results, by showing 
a possible positive employment effect due to the law. 
A monopsony model of the labour market occurs when there is a sector of the 
market that is defined by one buyer of labour in that particular market. The employer 
knows the labour supply offered and directly affects wages by determining the 
amount of employment he/she desires to meet targeted output at the minimum cost. 
Labour supply thus determines the amount of employment that a firm would choose 
to have. The simple model explains that the firm hires ‘L’ number of workers, with an 
increasing concave production function. Labour supply is denoted as Ls(w) and 
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Figure 2.3, below, shows that if the wage paid is equal to w**, then the firm will 
employ L**number of workers. Profit-maximisation conditions for wages and labour 
supply are found by differentiating the profit function with respect to wages. The 
wage paid by a monopsonist is below the marginal cost of labour, as the elasticity of 
labour supply with respect to wages is positive. This means that, ceteris paribus, an 
additional worker would be paid less than his/her productivity (Cahuc and 
Zylberberg, 2004). Figure 2.3 show that the wage paid by a monopsonist is less than 
the equilibrium wage (wc) that would equate supply and demand of labour.  
Figure 2.3 Minimum wages and a monopsony 
 
Source: Adapted from Cahuc and Zylberberg, (2004, pp.720) 
Including the minimum wage law in this setting would increase employment only if it 
is set at a wage between (w**) and (wc). In contrast, if it is higher than (wc) then the 
monopsonist will no longer stay on the labour supply curve. There are three factors 
that need to be considered before stating that a monopsonistic model increases 
employment in response to the minimum wage law. A first factor is that this type of 
labour market model is prevalent only in locations where there are a small number of 
firms and where there is low mobility of labour. Secondly, increases in employment 
are only found when the wage is set below the competitive wage level and finally, 
higher employment due to the minimum wage law occurs only when the wage 
elasticity of labour supply is high. However, empirical evidence states that the 
elasticity of labour is low, on average (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004).  
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With the introduction of a minimum wage, there are thus many hypothesized 
employment outcomes. In general, wages are expected to rise in the covered sector, 
although they may fall elsewhere. Unemployment may arise due to the increase in 
the quantity of workers supplied at the new higher minimum wage. However, there 
may also be movement of workers between covered and uncovered sectors, and 
employment may even rise under certain monopsony conditions. There can also be 
a fall in long term demand for labour because employers will adjust their business to 
compensate for the minimum wage. The next section reviews some of the empirical 
literature on the wage and employment effects due to the law. 
2.3 Empirical studies on the effects of minimum wages 
The employer’s response to minimum wages has been a topic studied by authors 
extensively over many decades. Traditionally, the paper by Stigler (1946) sparked 
interest in the furtherance of studies on this aspect of the labour market. Stigler’s 
paper aimed to address two important questions of whether minimum wage laws 
diminish poverty and whether there are efficient alternatives to minimum wage laws. 
Stigler (1946) subscribed to the belief that in a competitive market, there is a 
negative relationship between employment and minimum wages. This concept was 
challenged by studies such as Lester (1960) and Card and Krueger (1993), who 
found that the negative relationship is not evident.  
There is no consensus on the overall employment effects of such laws. Different 
authors can find different effects of the law, even when using the same data. Katz 
(1973) found that a previous study by Kalachek (1969), which found little or no 
negative effects on teenage employment resulting from the minimum wage law, to be 
interpreted wrongfully. Katz (1973) stated that the unemployment effect from such a 
law is equal to the product of the demand elasticity for teenage employment and the 
average change in wages due to the law. The models used to review Kalachek’s 
results included an aggregate supply and demand function of labour and a 
behavioural relationship which indicated the employers’ response to the law, with a 
dummy variable used to indicate the existence of the minimum wage law. He used 
the same time-series dataset as Kalachek and found a negative teenage 
employment effect due to the implementation of the law.  
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A re-evaluation of the effect of minimum wages on employment was called for in the 
US in the 1980s and 1990s since there had been many such contradicting findings. 
Neumark and Wascher (1992) made use of an econometric technique with nation-
wide time series data including geographic differences in minimum wages for the 
years 1977-1989. Their results showed that a ten percent increase in minimum 
wages would cause employment to fall by 1-2 percent and 1.5 percent for teenagers 
and young adults respectively. A distinctive difference between this study and prior 
research such as Katz’s (1973) study is the inclusion of fixed state and fixed year 
effects due to the use of panel data. The use of time-series data by Katz (1973) 
brought about a criticism that the estimated effects are only reflective of state 
average effects, and not minimum wage effects (Neumark and Wascher, 1992). The 
justification for using a fixed state model is that it allows for the identification of 
differences between each state’s economic conditions, and for the fixed year effects 
model that it controls for changes in, for example, business cycles.  
The research conducted by Card and Krueger (1993) explored the income 
distributional impact of the 1990-1991 increase in the US minimum wage. They also 
used state specific minimum wages but included overall levels of wages in their 
study. Their model presented results that showed that states with higher numbers of 
minimum wage paid employees had significantly decreased wage dispersion. The 
results were based on a natural experiment using the differences in the proportion of 
minimum wage workers affected by the law, across the different states. Furthermore, 
the increase in minimum wages led to a narrowing of the family income dispersion 
which consequently decreased poverty for those families who were labour force 
participants. However, the results from the minimum wage and poverty relationship 
can be said to be imprecise. A comparison study by Addison and Blackburn (1999) 
used a ‘reduced form’ approach to predict a relationship between the increases in 
minimum wage and coexistent changes in poverty measures. The authors used 
state-level panel data retrieved from the United States, March Current Population 
Survey for the years 1984-1997. The analysis focused on the three groups which 
were considered to be most affected by the law; namely, teenagers, young adults 
and junior school dropouts. The study found that for the three groups, a 25 percent 
increase in the minimum wage should see a fall of nine percent in the 1996 poverty 
rate. Additionally, there is evidence of increased employment from the higher 
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minimum wage laws for all three groups over the study period. However, the rise in 
the minimum wage in the 1990s reduced poverty, whereas the rise in the minimum 
wage for the 1980s did not see a reduction in poverty rates. The authors state that, 
after empirical investigation, they are unclear as to the reason for this difference.   
A labour market with monopsony power is critically evaluated by Dickens, Machin 
and Manning (1999). This allows for minimum wages to have various impacts on 
employment; namely, negative, neutral or positive impacts. The study addressed the 
gap in the research by allowing a division between the elasticity of labour supply to 
an individual firm and to the whole labour market, as well as allowing for different 
firms in the same market to be affected differently by the legislation. The authors 
draw fine distinctions between two main aspects of the minimum wage effects, 
namely, the minimum wage effect on the wage distribution and the minimum wage 
impact on employment. The former aspect is studied using a first differenced 
regression and the results show that the effect of the minimum wage on earnings is 
most distinct at the lowermost end of the distribution. The latter aspect is determined 
by a first differenced measure using three types of unemployment. The main result is 
that employment levels are unaffected by minimum wage laws, which is consistent 
with Lester (1960) and Card and Kruger’s (1993) papers. 
Studies in developing countries tend to support Stigler’s hypothesis. Costa Rica first 
implemented national minimum wage laws in 1938 which then was amended to 
contain several different minima for each industry, and was studied by Gindling and 
Terrell (2002). Costa Rica is a relevant comparator country to South Africa as it had 
several applicable wages for different occupations and industries set according to 
different categories of workers. Employment and minimum wage relationships were 
analysed for the years 1988 to 2000, using individual level pooled cross-sectional 
data. Several sensitivity analyses were conducted such as the issue of compliance, 
the effects of minimum wages in the public sector and the effects of minimum wages 
according to skill categories. The authors focus on the effects of minimum wages on 
employment and hours worked. A probit model estimated the impact of minimum 
wages on employment and a regression using Ordinary Least Squares was used to 
determine the effect of minimum wages on hours worked. They found that a ten 
percent increase in minimum wages would lead to a drop in employment by 1.09 
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percent and a drop in hours worked by just about 0.6 percent. Furthermore, their 
results show that minimum wages affect unskilled workers the most. They conclude 
by stating that employees who are dismissed from work in the minimum wage 
sectors turn to the uncovered sectors for employment. 
Another comparator country to South Africa is Brazil, in which minimum wage polices 
were implemented in 1940 in an attempt to combat high levels of income inequality. 
Some studies which were conducted in Brazil focused on the simulated employment 
effects due to the law, whereas Neumark, Cunningham and Siga (2006) used 
minimum wages to assess the income distribution before and after the law. The 
before-after model was estimated using data obtained from Brazilian Monthly 
Employment Surveys for six metropolitan areas for the period 1996 to 2001.The 
econometric model used cross-sectional and time series data to examine whether 
the law was binding. The time series data were used to account for increases in the 
legislated wage, while the cross-sectional data were used to determine differences in 
wage-levels in metropolitan areas that had equal increases in the nominal legislated 
minima. 
 In Brazil, the minimum wage is set nationally. Perfectly competitive labour market 
theory states that minimum wage laws decrease employment which suggests that 
there are losers and winners in the labour market. However, the income distribution 
effects resulting from the law are dependent on the size of the gains and losses and 
the position of where they occur in the income distribution. Overall, their findings, 
which used a framework that found direct causal estimates of the law’s effects, do 
not show a firm prediction of minimum wage effects on the income distribution. The 
minimum wage benefits workers at the low income end, but did not compress the 
overall income distribution since minimum wages decreased family income at the low 
income end through negative employment effects. The authors therefore provide 
evidence that minimum wages do not necessarily produce positive income 
distribution effects for low income families based on their results.   
A study that attempted to fill the gap in the minimum wage literature for Brazil by the 
presentation of wage and employment effects of the law independently for the 
informal and formal sectors of the labour market was done by Lemos (2009). The 
application of the study used panel data from the Brazilian Monthly Household 
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Survey for the years 1982 to 2004, to determine the effects of the minimum wage 
law on wages and employment. The basis of the empirical model was the Welch-
Gramlich-Mincer Two Sector Model outlined briefly in section 2.2. The hypothesized 
outcome in this model was that the labour income received in uncovered sectors 
would fall as unemployed workers from the covered sectors would flow into 
uncovered sectors. The informal and formal sectors of the Brazilian labour market 
were analysed. The model used was a reduced form equation, controlling for 
regional and macro-economic shocks. The empirical results found that while there 
was no effect on employment due to minimum wages, wage effects were large and 
significant. In other words, there was evidence of the compression of wage 
distributions in the formal and informal sectors. A segmented market, in theory, 
hypothesizes that workers will choose to be employed based on unobservable 
characteristics, and not on job characteristics. Brazil’s informal and formal sectors 
are integrated as employment opportunities have distinct characteristics from which 
heterogeneous workers can choose from (Maloney, 1999).Telles (1993) found that 
there is easy labour mobility between the two sectors. This gives support to the 
statement that Brazil is characterized by a segmented and integrated competitive 
market. The author concludes by stating that the empirical results are not coherent 
with the theoretical model predictions because of the underlying assumption about 
the labour market (Lemos, 2009). 
Minimum wage legislation in South Africa is relatively new when compared to other 
countries. However, several attempts have been made to evaluate the effect of 
minimum wages on employment and hours worked (Hertz, 2005; Millea, 2012; 
Dinkelman and Ranchhod, 2012).  
As outlined in section 2.1, South African minimum wage legislation is implemented 
for a segmented labour market, with separate minima for different sectors, 
geographical areas and working hours. The effect of sectoral wage minima on 
employment, wages and hours of work was the topic of a comprehensive study by 
Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet (2013). Five of the twelve sectors where the law applied 
were used to describe the impact of the law. The chosen econometric method was 
the difference-in-difference approach with quasi-experimental application. The data 
were obtained from the Labour Force Survey from September 2000 to September 
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2007, a period which included the implementation of the law. Each examined group, 
for whom the law was binding, was compared to a control group. This control group 
had similar demographic characteristics as the treatment group; however, this group 
was not employed in sectors where the law was imposed. The regression results 
showed that there were no negative employment effects at the extensive margin of 
labour demand. However, the results are suggestive that there was an increase at 
the intensive margin. The authors show evidence of an increase in real hourly wages 
in the post law period. The methodology of this Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet (2013) 
study will be closely followed in this dissertation, but with the effects of the law 
disaggregated by province. 
Millea, (2012) has written the most complete synthesis of the minimum wage law 
effects which emphasizes a segmented market, whereby the minimum wage impacts 
on earnings and employment in the formal and informal sectors are analysed. This 
was a broad examination of the law in covered formal, uncovered formal, covered 
informal and uncovered formal sectors. A two-step approach to evaluate the 
influence of minimum wage laws was undertaken. The first step made use of a probit 
model to evaluate employment changes. The subsequent step used estimated 
Mincerian wage equations, controlling for selection into employment. The Labour 
Force Survey provided the data for the authors for the years 2000 to 2007. The 
results for employment show that an individual is less likely to be employed in the 
formal sector after the law is implemented, and that the increase in average wages 
corresponds with the timing of the law. Moreover, the increases in wages are the 
largest for industries and workers who are most affected by the law. The author finds 
that high paid workers are unaffected and that covered formal workers have a higher 
wage and less negative employment effects than workers in an informal sector. In 
contrast, uncovered and informal low-earning workers experience an increase in 
wages and employment. The author reiterates that in a developing economy which is 
segmented by characteristics such as race, gender, occupation and formal and 
informal sectors, the minimum wage is a policy which is beneficial for workers in the 
informal sectors. These workers are recognized as the most vulnerable in the 
economy. The law had no substantial impact on higher income groups. 
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In addition to these general studies, the domestic worker sector in the country has 
been explored intensively by Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2012) as well as by Hertz 
(2005).This sector is typically comprised of low wage earners who are female and 
have no tertiary, or sometimes no secondary, schooling. Hertz (2005) used wages 
per hour, average per-month earnings and total earnings of domestic workers in 
periods prior and post law to determine the law’s effect. An econometric model using 
before-after comparisons concludes that average hourly wages rose by 20 percent 
after the introduction of the law. The study also implies that the increase in wages 
resulted in a five percent fall in average hours worked per week. Domestic workers 
therefore experienced a 15 percent increase in average real monthly earnings 
according to the model. The study supported the introduction of the law. 
A comparative study of the domestic worker industry done by Dinkelman and 
Ranchhod (2012) explored the effects of the law on the previously informal sector of 
domestic workers. The study conducts several sensitivity analyses which describe 
the impact of enforcement (or lack thereof). The assumption of no penalties for non-
compliance is a starting point to describe the law’s impact on employment, wages 
and hours worked. Before-after comparisons showed that there was a large increase 
in wages in the wake of the law. However, the intensive and extensive margins of 
work were not affected, which opposes Hertz’s (2005) conclusion. This study 
showed that employers respond voluntarily to increase wages. Evidence of 
formalisation of a previously informal market is shown by the increased contract 
coverage enforced by labour regulations.  
It was noted by Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2012) that the extent of compliance by 
employers with the law can have a large impact on wages and employment. Given 
the importance of compliance, the next section provides a model of the economics of 
compliance. 
2.3 Economic theory of compliance 
Neoclassical labour economics describes employers as profit maximising. Profits are 
determined by selling their output at a price (p) and subtracting the costs of 
production. Output is produced by employing factors of production such as labour 
and capital, which are paid by wages (w) and rent (r) respectively. Assuming that the 
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market is perfectly competitive, firms will operate where the marginal product of 
labour is equal to the price of labour (w) and the marginal product of capital is equal 
to the price of capital (r). This ensures that the factors of production are being 
optimally used to enable the firm to maximise profit. Holding output constant, profit 
increases as prices increase and decreases when wages and/or rent increases. 
Implementing the idea of minimum wage (M) being higher than the market wage, 
ceteris paribus, the profits of firms should theoretically fall by π(w,r,p) –π (M,r,p) > 0. 
This introduces the implication that firms may not voluntarily comply with minimum 
wage laws unless there are inspections or penalties for noncompliance with the law 
(Ashenfelter and Smith, 1979). 
An employer that chooses to not comply with the law knows that there is a probability 
of being caught, λ, that is linked to a penalty payment of D. The following equation 
shows that the expected profits are: 
E (π) = (1-λ) π (w, r, p) + λ π (M, r, p) - λ D 
The profit obtained if the employer complies with the law is equal to π (M, r, p). 
Therefore, he/she will not comply if: 
E (π) - π (M,r,p) =(1-λ)[ π (w,r,p) -π (M,r,p) ] - λ D > 0 
Without going through the second order Taylor series derivations for the terms in the 
brackets, it then follows that: 
∂π
∂w
 = - L 
∂2π
∂w2
 = - ∂L
∂w
 
Which then gives: π (w, r, p) -π (M, r, p) ≈ L (M-w) – ½(∂L
∂w
) (M-w)2 
Employers will decide not to comply with the law if: 




 (M – w)2 e] > [ λ
(1-λ)
] D 




) < 0 and λ
(1-λ)
is the odds of being 
caught. 
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The above inequality shows that an employer will choose not to comply with the law 
if the expected penalty is small, either because it is easy to escape detection or that 
the monetary value of the penalty is small. Overall, the incentive to comply is lower 
when the market wage is far below the minimum or if there is a large elasticity of 
demand for labour. Firms that employ a large number of low-wage employees, and 
for which changes in wages result in large employment changes, have the greatest 
incentive not to comply with the law (Ashenfelter and Smith, 1979).  
Even though it is not possible to estimate the probability of violation, it is possible to 
provide an indication of the incentives to violate the law. The expected cost of 
violation is equal to λD, and the expected saving of the labour costs if the firm does 
not comply with the law is equal to(1-λ)L(M-w). It can then be shown that it would be 





 > [λD –(1-λ)L(M-w)]
(1-λ)L(M-w)
 
The above equation is explained as violation occurs if employment losses are 
greater than two times the proportional excess of penalties over the expected wage-
bill savings. If the elasticity of demand is set equal to zero, then the incentive to 
violate the law would be the expected monetary value of violation which is smaller 
than the expected wage bill savings (Ashenfelter and Smith, 1979).  
A commonly used measure of compliance in the literature is the Kaitz Index which 
measures the toughness of the set minimum wage (Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet, 
2012a). The index can be calculated as the ratio of the minimum wage relative to 
average wage or median wage of the economy. The Kaitz Index used by Andalόn 
and Pagés (2008) is the ratio of the minimum wage relative to the median wage as 
they suggest that the median wage is a better measure compared to average wage 
in countries with high income inequalities, or where the minimum wage could affect 
average wages.  By comparing the value of this measure across sectors, it may be 
used to investigate possible determinants of non-compliance with the minimum wage 
law (Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet, 2012a). 
Similarly, Chuang (2006) used the widely used formula, given below, as an input to 
the model used to determine employment effects of the law.  
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×Cii  ; 
Where: i is the industry subscript; MW i is the minimum wage applicable to industry i; 
AWi is the average wage for industry i; Ei is the number of employed individuals in 
industry i; TE is total employment in the economy and Ci is the rate of coverage in 
industry i.   
The first model of compliance, described by Ashenfelter and Smith (1979) shows 
when there are incentives to violate the law, whereas the Kaitz Index measures the 
rigidity of the minimum wage that is set. The index can also be used as an input to 
employment models to determine the changes in employment due to the adoption of 
the law in industries and economies. The next section gives a brief summary of 
empirical research on the relationship between compliance and minimum wage laws 
in several countries.  
2.5 Empirical studies of compliance and minimum wage laws 
The motivation for studying compliance is that if, in practice, the law only affects a 
small number of the workers whom it targets, and then its overall effectiveness is 
reduced. Therefore if it is found that the law has a limited effect on wages or 
employment it may be due to a lack of compliance, rather than a real lack of effect. 
This makes the case for compliance with the law to be reviewed. 
North America was one of the first regions to implement minimum wage laws, which 
led to Ashenfelter and Smith (1979) to investigate the extent to which the US federal 
minimum wage law was adhered to. Labour market regulations, to be effective, need 
an active government enforcement policy such as random firm inspections and/or 
penalties. The authors noted that the assumption of full compliance is unrealistic and 
therefore examined whether profit-maximising firms were responsive to the law by 
using government inspection as a measure of compliance. Data were collected from 
the May Current Population Survey in the US for the years 1973 and 1975. The 
number of compliance officers in 1973 amounted to 880, and increased in 1975 to 
one thousand. Previous evidence showed that inspections were not random, but 
were concentrated in sectors where non-compliance was more probable. This can 
be supplemented by the fact that only 37 percent employees earning less than the 
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federal minimum were located in the southern, low-wage-region but 50 percent of 
compliance officers were assigned to this region. 
The econometric estimation was separated into three broad analyses. Firstly, 
compliance was estimated individually for age, region, race and gender. Compliance 
for the country was estimated at 69 percent overall, but with variation in compliance 
for each group. Secondly, leaving age aside, it was found that the highest 
compliance estimate was among workers whose wages would be lowest in the 
absence of the law. This implies that the incentive to violate the law is reduced by 
the increased probability of inspection by government enforcement agencies. Thirdly, 
a comparison between age group compliance estimates was determined. Younger 
workers faced lower employer-compliance estimates than their older counterparts. 
The reasoning behind this is that inspections are carried out on the basis of 
complaints. Taking into consideration that younger workers have a low job 
attainment, the number of complaints by the young may be relatively small compared 
to the amount of complaints by the older workers, hence a smaller probability of 
inspection and lower incentive for these firms to comply. Additionally, these results 
were compared to the results from estimating the same equation using1975 data. 
Compliance levels were concluded to be stable over the two years as the estimates 
were similar (Ashenfelter and Smith, 1979).   
Overall, the paper showed that wages of the covered and uncovered sectors are 
affected even when there is incomplete compliance with the regulation. The authors 
emphasized that the low-wage sectors of the labour market cannot be understood to 
the full extent unless interactions between the legal and economic behaviour of firms 
are taken into account (Ashenfelter and Smith, 1979). 
The motivation for the study put forth by Ronconi (2010) suggests that workers who 
provide labour in developing countries are subject to poor working conditions. These 
conditions are the result of low compliance with labour regulations because of the 
absence of incentives for employers to comply. Non-compliance with labour 
regulations is of importance because it distorts the allocation of resources and 
distorts the notion that the law is applied equally to all workers. In a broader, 
macroeconomic view, failing to comply with the regulations can affect the state’s 
capacity to implement redistribution policies. The theoretical argument that firms are 
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responsive to regulations if the probability of inspection is high is the basis of the 
research question. The purpose of the research was to estimate the effect of the 
variation in enforcement on the likelihood that employers violate labour regulations in 
Argentina. The study period was 1995-2002, and made use of panel data and 
estimating methods of Ordinary Least Squares and two-stage-least squares. 
Ronconi acknowledges that there are two challenges in estimating the causal effect 
of enforcement on compliance. Firstly, measures of enforcement are inadequate and 
not easily available. He uses a proxy for enforcement which is the number of labour 
inspectors per one hundred thousand workers. The second challenge is the potential 
simultaneous relationship between enforcement and compliance, which is addressed 
by using the existence of the electoral cycle in labour inspector staff as an 
instrument. Descriptive statistics showed that overall compliance and enforcement 
decreased over time from more than 50 percent in 1995 to less than 40 percent in 
2002. Furthermore, the number of labour inspectors decreased by approximately 30 
percent. The theoretical predictions were supported by evidence from the research, 
whereby there was a positive relationship between the number of labour inspectors 
and the level of compliance (Ronconi, 2010). 
The empirical model comprised of two simultaneous equations of enforcement and 
compliance, each containing vectors of provincial fixed effects. The two-stage-least-
squares estimation included the instrumental variable of electoral years as an 
exogenous determinant of enforcement, since elections affected compliance through 
government control of the resources of enforcement agencies. Furthermore, working 
conditions and employment protection of the workers directly affect the electoral 
position of candidates. In the Ordinary Least Squares estimates, provinces with 
higher enforcement tended to have higher levels of compliance. Inclusion of fixed 
effects showed that within-provincial variation in enforcement is not correlated with 
compliance. This means that even if there are extra inspectors employed by 
enforcement agencies, it does not mean that compliance with the law will increase, 
because these labour inspectors may not be competent enough to ensure 
compliance. Ronconi (2010) performed a Hausman test for endogeneity and rejected 
the hypothesis that enforcement is exogenous in the compliance equation, and thus 
the Ordinary Least Squares estimates were inconsistent. The estimated effects of 
enforcement from two-stage-least-squares regressions were larger than the Ordinary 
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Least Squares estimates. Overall, the results were interpreted as meaning that an 
increase of one labour inspector hired led to an increase in minimum wage 
compliance by 0.04 percent, ceteris paribus. This research paper thus filled a gap 
where evidence is scarce in developing countries on the effects of enforcement on 
compliance. 
A study conducted by Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet (2012a) added to the South African 
labour market literature by exploring the extent to which the law was violated. The 
goal of the paper was to measure the violation of the law, corresponding to the level, 
depth and severity of non-compliance. The authors matched data from the 2007 
Labour Force Survey to corresponding sectors and the locations of these sectors as 
specified by the legislated minima. The results were obtained by using a model 
which included parameters such as the applicable minimum wage for each sector 
and location, actual wages received and an index which represents the depth of 
violation. The index of violation measures the percentage of covered workers that 
are paid the stipulated wage and the average difference between the lawful wage 
and actual wage. The main findings were that employees in minimum wage sectors 
were on average, receiving wages that were 44 percent below the required rate. The 
sectors which produced the highest non-compliance figures were the security, 
farming and forestry sectors. The authors state that the types of occupation, as well 
as location of work are factors which affect non-compliance.  
In a follow-up paper, the same authors went on to estimate the underlying 
relationship between government enforcement and compliance with the minimum 
wage law (Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet, 2012b). As their previous study concluded, 
South Africa has high estimates of non-compliance to the law, which led the authors 
to examine the determinants of the probability of violation using a probit model, as 
well as the depth of the violation using the index of violation from the previous study. 
The number of labour inspectors is used as a proxy for enforcement; however, 
enforcement data is limited in South Africa, so they use the number of labour 
inspectors per million workers reported in 2007 at a provincial level. Noting the 
potential simultaneity between enforcement and compliance, the authors also use an 
instrumental variable, which is the number of non-inspectors. Non-inspectors are 
described by the authors to be those that are employed by the Department of Labour 
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at labour centres, but do not form part of the body of inspectors. This is used as an 
instrumental variable for the number of labour inspectors as the number of non-
inspectors is regarded as an indication of the size of the body of inspectors but not 
related to the compliance with the minimum wage law. 
With regards to the likelihood of individual violation, the estimates showed that race 
and gender play an important role in determining whether an individual receives 
lower than stipulated wages, with African and female workers being at the largest 
disadvantage. Furthermore, the sector of employment and the size of the firm in 
which an individual is employed also played a role in predicting violation. Turning to 
the depth of violation, the Kaitz index was found to be negative and significant. This 
implied that minimum wages that are higher than the median wage result in a larger 
depth of the violation. A one percent increase in the Kaitz ratio would lead to an 
increase in the depth of violation per individual of 0.7 percent. The depth of violation 
is determined by the age and education levels of an individual. Furthermore, firm-
level and contractual factors, as well as local labour market conditions, affect the 
depth of violation (Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet, 2012a). 
2.6 Conclusion 
Economic theories show different effects of minimum wage laws on wages and 
employment, of depending on the assumptions of the underlying labour market 
models. In a perfectly competitive setting, covered sectors may experience 
unemployment which causes the affected workers to seek employment in uncovered 
sectors. This in turn lowers the wages received by workers in the uncovered sectors. 
However, whether employment occurs in the uncovered sectors depends on the 
elasticity of labour demand. In contrast, in a monopsony-type labour market, the 
minimum wage law may increase employment, but this statement should be 
interpreted with respect to the location of this labour market, the minimum wage 
being set relative to the monopsony wage and with respect to the wage elasticity of 
labour.  
It is apparent from the reviewed empirical studies that a minimum wage policy may 
have ambiguous, adverse or beneficial effects on labour market outcomes. In 
developed countries, a negative relationship with employment is debated, whilst in 
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developing countries, there is typically a positive effect on wages as shown by Hertz 
(2005) and Millea (2012). The negative employment effect is shown by Neumark and 
Wascher (1992) and Gindling and Terrell (2002), whereas Lester (1960), Lemos 
(2009) Card and Krueger (1993) find no clear negative effect on employment.  
In South Africa, the minimum wage law is of importance as there is a large 
proportion of the population which are earning low wages, combined with poor 
working conditions. The implementation of the law, as measured by employers’ 
compliance, is of utmost importance if the law is intended to benefit those who are 
vulnerable. In theory the incentives for non-compliance are higher when the market 
wage is far below the stipulated wage and when the absolute value of the elasticity 
of the demand for labour is large (Ashenfelter and Smith, 1979). In developing 
countries, it is common that the law is violated. Combining compliance with the law 
with the employment and wage effects will provide a more comprehensive picture of 
the effectiveness of the minimum wage law.  
It is also clear from the work of Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet (2012a, 2012b) that the 
location of work and the characteristics of local labour markets are important for both 
compliance and the effects of minimum wages. The empirical component of this 
dissertation therefore aims to contribute to this understanding of the geographical 
variation in minimum wage effects. The subsequent chapter gives a detailed 
description of the dataset, sectors and provinces that are analysed econometrically 
in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 3. DATA 
Chapter 2 illustrated that there is an extensive international literature on the effects 
of minimum wage laws. In South Africa, studies have been carried out either at a 
national level, or by focusing on an individual sector. There is therefore currently a 
gap in knowledge about how minimum wage laws might affect different geographical 
regions in varied ways. This chapter describes in detail the dataset used for the 
empirical estimation of wages and employment at a provincial level, which was 
obtained from the Labour Force Survey (LFS).   
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. It also includes a brief 
description of the LFS and the methods of allocating workers to the respective 
sectors of employment in section 3.1. The sectors of interest, namely the domestic 
worker, retail and security sectors are described in section 3.2. In addition to this, 
descriptive statistics are also included in the description of the respective sectors. 
Motivations for using the Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape provinces as 
geographical locations are presented in section 3.3. Thereafter, section 3.4 provides 
a summary of the overall sample used for the dissertation.  
3.1 Dataset 
The pooled dataset used for this research paper is derived from the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) conducted by StatsSA for the years 2000 to 2007, bi-annually. The 
reason for this time period is that it can provide an insight into the labour market of 
the chosen sectors before and after the law. It can also provide evidence of whether 
the law was harmful or beneficial to the chosen sectors.The labour markets, both 
formal and informal, of the country are surveyed at a household level in the LFS. 
Participants in the survey comprise of the members of 30 000 households across the 
country, which include approximately 65 000 working aged individuals (15-65 years). 
The LFS is designed as a rotating panel sample, which is a survey which reports 
outcomes from the “same dwellings on a number of occasions and replacing a 
proportion of these dwelling units each round” (StatsSA, 2000b). The reason for 
adding new dwellings is to substitute those dwellings that are removed. This type of 
survey design has an advantage in terms of being able to track changes in the 
labour market whilst studying individual employment changes in the same household 
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over time (StatSA, 2000b). This adds to the reliability and validity of the dataset 
used. However, only the September 2001 to March 2004 rounds of the LFS were 
released as a matched panel dataset, which does not provide a long enough time 
period to study the effects of the minimum wage laws. For this study, the dataset 
therefore consist of eight waves of the LFS from September 2000 to September 
2007. Only the September rounds of the survey will be used to avoid seasonal 
variations in employment. These waves were pooled and treated as repeated cross-
sections over time, since the same individuals were not interviewed or matched in 
every survey.  
The survey is made up of seven sections with a total of ninety-seven questions 
which address several aspects of the labour market. The seven sections are namely; 
demographic, biological, activities of work in the past week, unemployment and non-
economic activity, main work in the past week, job creation proposals and 
uncompensated agricultural activity in the past six months. Specifically, section two 
provides questions relating to employment status and section four provides 
questions relating to the amount of wages received. Section one allows individuals to 
answer questions based on their skills and educational levels (StatSA, 2000b). Since 
the questions throughout the period of the LFS survey had not changed, the 
responses can be pooled into a single dataset and correctly compared across time. 
Throughout the analysis, the sample estimates are weighted to population levels 
using weights provided by StatsSA. 
In each LFS wave, individuals in minimum wage sectors are identified using the 
combination of the SASCO occupation codes and the ISIC industry codes. Following 
the methodology of Bhorat et al (2013), the self-employed and union members are 
excluded from the analysis. Wages which are reported monthly are converted to 
hourly earnings using the average number of hours worked per week. Additionally, to 
allow for a comparison across time, wages used in the following empirical analysis 
are deflated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) which is reported by StatSA 
(2009), so that all wage figures are presented in 2008 prices.   
The specification of control groups for each sector is imperative in order to establish 
effects unique to each sector due to the law. Each control group has similar 
characteristics to the treatment groups but they are employed in sectors where 
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minimum wage is not compulsory. Overall, for the wage analysis, the control groups 
were restricted to low-earning individuals of working age who did not obtain more 
than twelve years of schooling, following the methodology of Bhorat et al (2013). 
Additionally, a control group is established to determine the employment effects of 
minimum wages, which includes working age individuals with similar characteristics 
to those in minimum wage-affected occupations. The selection of these groups is 
outlined in sections 3.3 and 3.4. 
3.2 Geographic locations 
The provinces of study are the Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng. The 
minimum wage laws in South Africa vary across geographical areas as the living 
costs vary from one region to another (Cottle, 2015). The reason for varying living 
costs is due to the level of urbanisation being different in provinces across South 
Africa. The DoL demarcates areas for the purpose of setting minima, which is based 
on the average household income reported in municipal areas on the basis of the 
1996 census. In general, areas are categorized as follows: A – Average income 
greater than R24,000 per annum; B – Average income between R12,000 and 
R24,000 per annum; C – Average income less than R12,000 per annum (DoL, 
2003). Provincial differences in the wage and employment effects due to the law are 
of interest, since KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and the Western Cape collectively 
contribute to about 66 percent of the country’s GDP (StatsSA, 2014). Employment 
and wages directly contribute to this and therefore the differential effects of the law in 
these provinces may provide insight to the law’s effect on the economy as a whole. 
However, unlike previous studies which estimate the overall national effect, focusing 
on specific provinces allows for the effects of the law to vary spatially. 
There are some substantial differences in economic characteristics across these 
three provinces. In 2001, Western Cape had a narrow unemployment rate of 17.7 
percent whereas KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng had rates of 33.8 percent and 30.4 
percent respectively. However, by 2007, Gauteng’s and Western Cape’s 
unemployment rate fell to 17.4 percent and 15.7 percent respectively, While 
KwaZulu-Natal’s unemployment remained substantially higher than the other two 
provinces, at 30 percent (StatsSA, 2007). The large decrease in unemployment for 
Gauteng and the relatively higher rate for KwaZulu-Natal further motivates the choice 
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of these provinces to be analysed, since the different economic climates may have 
differential relationships with the law.  
An additional factor which supported the choice of these three provinces was the 
differences in the racial composition of each province. The Western Cape population 
of coloureds is approximately 52 percent, whereas KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng’s 
population is dominated by African individuals (87 percent and 75 percent 
respectively) (StatSA, 2014). Different racial compositions between provinces are 
associated with different historical and political developments, as well as different 
educational attainments, and thus may provide a more nuanced assessment of the 
law within each province.  
Average income levels between the 2006 and 2011, as measured by StatsSA 
(2011), show that Western Cape had the highest initial average income although this 
fell by 13.7 percent by 2011. In contrast, KwaZulu-Natal’s average income grew by 
approximately 27 percent between the periods, and Gauteng’s average income 
increased by approximately 16.8 percent (StatsSA, 2011). The provincial differences 
in income levels show that the law may have a different impact in each province and 
each sector.  
Provincial differences in the wage and employment effects due to the law are of 
interest as there is an ongoing debate regarding the possible implementation of a 
uniform national minimum wage to support an acceptable living standard (Cottle, 
2015). An examination of the provincial differences in the current law’s effects would 
then provide an insight into whether a uniform wage or a sectoral wage, that differs 
according to areas of work, is beneficial to those affected by the laws.There are 
several sectoral determinations which vary according to geographical areas with 
different economic conditions. The different economic climates of each province 
relates to the level of urbanisation. Higher levels of urbanisation are usually 
associated with higher levels of business activity, which will then affect the retail and 
security sector in a positive manner. However, within the urban areas, average 
household income varies from upper-income levels to upper-middle income, which 
then affects domestic worker employment.    
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The levels of compliance with the law and enforcement methods are also likely to be 
different in these provinces because of the distribution of enforcement agencies, 
which adds to the case whereby the law may have different impacts in each 
province. According to 2006 figures, there were a total of 706 inspectors that were 
employed by the IES. There were 42 inspectors in Mpumalanga, 69 in Limpopo, 159 
in Gauteng (49 in Gauteng North and 110 in Gauteng South), 58 in the Free State, 
133 in KwaZulu-Natal, 33 in the Northern Cape, 53 in the North West, 95 in the 
Western Cape, and 64 in the Eastern Cape (Godfrey, Maree and Theron, 2006). 
According to Godfrey et al. (2006), there were approximately 1 006 500 employers 
and 3 445 726 employees that were covered by the sectoral determinations in 2006. 
It can be seen that there are relatively few inspectors when compared to the number 
of employees and employers covered by the law, and that the number of inspectors 
varies by geographical location.  
3.3 Sample 
The choice of the sample and definitions of treatment and control groups follow the 
methodology of Bhorat et al (2013), where it was applied at a national level. For the 
wage analysis, the sample of individuals for the research are aged between 15 and 
65 who are full time workers and are working in urban areas in the Western Cape, 
KwaZulu-Natal or Gauteng. Furthermore, employees who work for more than fifteen 
hours per day, those who earn within the top one percent of earners in each sector 
are regarded as workers who are earning very high wages and therefore are 
excluded, as they are not affected by the law. Those who state zero or missing 
wages are not included in the sample. Wage information provided by workers in the 
LFS is either in the form of point estimates or monthly brackets. Monthly brackets 
were converted to point estimates using the bracket midpoints. Workers may provide 
wage information in the LFS as either point estimates or in monthly brackets (Bhorat 
et al., 2012a). It is important to note that if the bracket midpoint lies below the 
minimum wage, then all people reporting a wage in that bracket would be classified 
as earning less than the minimum wage, when in fact some fraction of them may well 
be above the minimum. In such a case, this method would overstate the extent of 
non-compliance. However, if the bracket midpoint lies above the minimum wage, 
then the reverse would be true. For the employment and wage analysis, the control 
Page 31 of 98 
 
group is made up of working age individuals who were either employed or looking for 
employment (according to the narrow definition of unemployment) and who had no 
more than a matric level of education. This less restrictive control group allows for 
unemployed persons or those who have switched jobs between waves, to be 
accounted for.  
According to StatsSA (2014), those in skilled occupations include managers, 
professionals and technicians; semi-skilled occupations include clerks, sales and 
services, skilled agriculture, craft and machine operators and unskilled occupations 
are those that are elementary in nature and domestic workers. Table 3.1 shows each 
skill group and the occupations that are included in each group. 
Table 3.1 Skill Groups and Occupations 
Skill Category Occupations 
Skilled Legislators, senior officials and managers (including legislators and senior officials; corporate 
managers; and general managers); professionals (including physical, mathematical and 
engineering science professionals; life science and health professionals; teaching professionals; 
and other professionals); technicians and associate professionals (including physical and 
engineering science associate professionals, life science and health associate professionals; 
teaching associate professionals; and other associate professionals) 
Semi-skilled Clerks (including office clerks; and customer service clerks); sales (including personal and 
protective services workers; and models, salespersons and demonstrators); craft and related 
trade workers (including extraction and building trades workers; metal, machinery and related 
trades workers; precision, handicraft, printing and related workers; and other craft and related 
trades workers) 
Unskilled Skilled agricultural and fishery workers (including market-oriented skilled agricultural and fishery 
workers; and subsistence agricultural and fishery workers); plant and machine operators and 
assemblers (including stationary-plant and related operators; machine operators and 
assemblers; and drivers and mobile-plant operators); elementary occupations (including sales 
and service elementary occupations; agricultural, fishery and related labourers; labourers in 
mining construction, manufacturing and transport); domestic workers 
Source:  Liebenberg and Roefs (2001) 
3.4 Sectors 
The Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 2002, is applicable to all workers in 
South Africa, with the exception of the Defence Force and secret service agencies. 
The amended Act stipulates minimum requirements of working conditions to which 
all employers must adhere to. The Act covers topics such as hours of work, overtime 
limits, overtime rates of pay, annual leave, sick leave, maternity and paternity leave, 
family responsibility leave, notice periods and records required to be kept by 
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employers. There are also methods contained in the Act that allow for these 
conditions to be varied. It is important to note that there is no mention of minimum 
wage settings as these are contained in another legislative document, termed the 
sectoral determinations. In addition to this, it introduced the Employment Conditions 
Commission (ECC) which provides advisory and reporting services for determination 
of sectoral minimum wages. There is also a notable difference in minimum wages for 
those who are categorised as full-time and part-time workers, where part-time 
workers have a higher minima compared to full-time minima. The analysis done in 
this research project only accounts for full-time workers, whereby the observed 
results of employment and wage differences may be accounted for by changes to 
part-time employment and wages (BCEA, 2002) 
A sectoral determination is a legal document which states basic employment 
conditions in a sector and geographical area. In order for a minimum wage to be set, 
the ECC is required to report, provide advice and make recommendations to the 
Minister of Labour of results from an investigation into the specific sector. The most 
important outcome of a sectoral determination is that it provides the legal minimum 
wage, that varies by occupation and location, which needs to be adhered to for the 
sector (Godfrey et al., 2006). Each year the wage is regularly updated for inflation 
through a formal government gazetting process. It is usually calculated based on the 
Minimum Wage for the sector, + CPIX/CPI + 1% (My Wage, 2016). 
The research focuses on three key sectors: retail/wholesale, domestic work, and 
security. These sectors were chosen for the analysis because they are 
predominantly located in urban areas which provide a large quantity of employment 
for individuals. This is likely to provide an informative measure of the law’s impact, as 
the majority of the individuals employed in these sectors are from low-income 
households who have low educational levels. According to Cosatu (2015), two out of 
three workers who are covered by the sectoral determinations are living in poverty. It 
can be seen from Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 that domestic workers have an average of 
seven years of schooling and the private security and retail sector have an average 
of ten years of schooling. The law is said to be in place to protect these vulnerable 
workers, and therefore these sectors were selected. Furthermore, the domestic 
worker sector in South Africa has been explored extensively (Dinkelman and 
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Ranchodd, 2012), and hence the inclusion of this sector may provide results that 
support or oppose previous studies. The retail sector has the most diverse 
employment composition which can be seen below in the discussion of retail 
workers. Inclusion of this sector may provide a less streamlined view of the law’s 
impact. Finally, the security sector was added to the analysis because this sector 
has gained importance in urban areas due to the increase in crime. It also employs a 
large proportion of young African males, who make-up 80.3 percent of the South 
African population (StatsSA, 2014), and from Table 3.5, the average age for the 
national private security sector is 32 , with 90 percent employment of males and 84.4 
percent of African employment. Therefore assessing the law on this sector may 
provide a broader picture of usefulness of the law.  
Table 3.2 details the date of implementation for each of the analysed sectors, along 
with hourly initial minima and changes thereof. As mentioned, there are several 
minima for each of the sectors as it varies on a national, regional and occupational. 
This being said, Table 3.2 only shows the minima for sectors in urban areas (Area A) 
and for those who are considered to be full-time workers (those who work more than 
27 hours per week).. Full-time domestic workers (those who work more than 27 
hours per week) in an urban area were entitled to R4.10 per hour at the date of 
implementation. February 2003 saw the introduction of the retail sector minima which 
can be seen to vary according to occupation shown by the initial wage at R14.87 per 
hour for managers but R6.76 per hour for forklift drivers. The security sector contains 
five grades of security workers, however, Table 3.2 shows the initial minima for only 
grade A security workers as it overlaps with the security occupations identified using 
the ISIC codes. The wage for these workers was set at R12.18 in November 2001, 
when it was introduced. Each legislated wage was then adjusted upward, annually, 
by a factor of approximately CPIX/CPI+1% (My Wage, 2016) through a formal 
gazetting process and is shown below. 
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Table 3.2 Sectoral minima and introduction dates 
Sector Occupation Date of 
Implementation 
Hourly Minimum Wage 
   2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Domestic 
worker 
N/A August 2003 - - R4.10 R4.42 R4.77 R5.11 R5.47 
Retail Managers February 2003 - - R14.87 R16.18 R17.61 R18.61 R19.73 
 Clerks  - - R9.39 R10.21 R11.11 R11.74 R12.44 
 Salespersons  - - R9.39 R10.21 R11.11 R11.74 R12.44 
 Drivers  - - R10.38 R11.29 R12.28 R12.98 R13.76 
 Fork-lift 
operators 
 - - R6.76 R7.35 R7.98 R8.43 R8.94 
 Cashiers    R7.93 R8.62 R9.38 R9.91 R10.50 
Security Grade A November 2001 R12.18 R12.66 R13.14 R13.14 R13.14 R13.72 R14.29 
Source: Adapted from Bhorat et al. (2013) 
The control group identified for each sector follows the methodology of Bhorat et al. 
(2013).Descriptions the demographic characteristics of each sector, as well its 
control group, are presented below in Tables 3.2 to 3.4. For each table, the figures 
represent the mean age and number of years of completed education, as well as the 
proportion of individuals who are male and who fall into each population group. The 
estimates are presented separately for each province of interest. Finally, the last 
column in the table shows the estimates for the country as a whole, including all nine 
provinces, for comparison purposes. 
3.4.1 Domestic Workers 
The minimum wage law for domestic workers was introduced in August 2002. In their 
national-level study, Bhorat et al. (2013) found that domestic workers are 
predominately African and Coloured females with less than twelve years of 
education. Urban areas provide the majority of employment for this sector. 
Therefore, the control group for this sector contains females who are African or 
Coloured who are employed in unskilled occupations that are not affected by the law. 
Table 3.3 below shows that the domestic worker sector largely comprises of females, 
with a grade seven levelling of education, aged between 38 and 41 years in each of 
the analysed provinces, as well as nationally. The lowest probability of 2.6 percent 
male employment in this sector is found in Western Cape; however, across the 
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provinces and across the nation, there is a very low male employment probability 
which then leads to the control group being restricted to females only. The summary 
statistics also show that the majority of the domestic worker sector is African in race 
and then followed by Coloureds in KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and nationally. In 
contrast to this, the Western Cape domestic worker sector is more or less split 
between these two races, with a somewhat higher proportion of Coloured than 
African workers. The domestic worker control group shows that the racial 
employment in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng is very similar to the treatment group. 
That is, the control group employment is largely African in race. The Western Cape 
also employs Coloureds and Africans; however, when compared to the treatment 
group, there are a larger percentage of Coloured workers. The control group attained 
a slightly higher average number of years of schooling than the treatment group, at 
eight years, with the difference being particularly large in Gauteng. 
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Table 3.3 Mean sample characteristics of treatment and control groups: domestic 
work sector 
Variables Western Cape KwaZulu-Natal Gauteng National 
 Domestic Control Domestic Control Domestic Control Domestic Control 
Age 39.312 32.981 37.888 36.873 40.969 37.091 40.265 36.099 
 (0.510) (0.358) (0.366) (0.419) (0.369) (0.487) (0.200) (0.231) 
Male 0.026 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.048 0.000 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
African 0.409 0.266 0.993 0.986 0.978 0.971 0.907 0.810 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) 
Coloured 0.589 0.734 0.002 0.014 0.016 0.029 0.088 0.190 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) 
Indian 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
White 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Years of schooling 7.704 8.225 7.186 7.482 7.219 9.066 6.925 8.273 
 (0.131) (0.103) (0.111) (0.157) (0.131) (0.129) (0.067) (0.071) 
Sample 1241 1299 1738 1060 2072 762 7589 3977 
Population 343870 306847 883257 418041 1328510 503695 3246459 1467677 
Source: LFS September 2000 – September 2007, own calculations 
Notes: The data are weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample includes non-self-
employed workers aged 15 to 65 in urban areas, who work full time (at least 27 hours per week) 
3.4.2 Retail/ Wholesale Sectors 
As shown in Table 3.2, the minimum wage law for this sector was implemented in 
February 2003, whereby various wages were set at a minimum according to job 
type, hours worked and areas of employment. Workers in the retail sector are 
typically located in metropolitan areas with higher levels of education when 
compared to the domestic worker sector (Bhorat et al, 2013). Furthermore, semi-
skilled workers are the majority in this sector. Using the ISIC occupation codes, it is 
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possible to identify salespersons, shop assistants, cashiers, and drivers and forklift 
operators as the treatment group. The control group for this sector compromises of 
semi-skilled workers who are not affected by the law.  
Table 3.4 below shows the mean sample characteristics of individuals in the retail 
sector treatment and control groups for the wage analysis, by province. The mean 
age of retail workers is approximately 33 across all provinces. In the Western Cape, 
there is an almost equal probability that males and females are employed in this 
sector, but the sector is more male-dominated in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng. With 
regards to racial composition of employment, in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng this 
sector is African dominated whereas it is coloured dominated in Western Cape. in 
the Western Cape. The average number of completed schooling years, for both the 
treatment and control groups, is approximately equivalent to grade ten. 
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Table 3.4 Mean sample characteristics of treatment and control groups: retail sector 
Variables Western Cape KwaZulu-Natal Gauteng National 
 Retail Control Retail Control Retail Control Retail Control 
Age 31.786 34.024 33.098 35.234 34.061 34.566 33.372 34.944 
 (0.469) (0.251) (0.439) (0.206) (0.350) (0.178) (0.209) (0.106) 
Male 0.499 0.651 0.598 0.630 0.621 0.703 0.578 0.670 
 (0.025) (0.011) (0.019) (0.009) (0.017) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) 
African 0.178 0.255 0.631 0.707 0.793 0.744 0.636 0.656 
 (0.020) (0.011) (0.019) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) 
Coloured 0.675 0.584 0.039 0.033 0.050 0.048 0.142 0.125 
 (0.024) (0.012) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) 
Indian 0.007 0.004 0.284 0.188 0.032 0.025 0.103 0.063 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.017) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) 
White 0.140 0.157 0.046 0.072 0.125 0.183 0.119 0.156 
 (0.018) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) 
Years of schooling 9.997 9.449 10.159 9.397 9.988 9.846 10.006 9.523 
 (0.121) (0.063) (0.091) (0.054) (0.103) (0.048) (0.054) (0.028) 
Sample 848 3561 1060 4750 1272 5210 4427 18317 
Population 293862 1251856 633180 2544821 897605 3951624 2217069 9371475 
Source: LFS September 2000 – September 2007, own calculations 
Notes: The data are weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample includes non-self-
employed workers aged 15 to 65 in urban areas, who work full time (at least 27 hours per week) 
3.4.3 Security 
November 2001 saw the introduction of the minimum wage for the private security 
sector. Within this sector, there are five area types and several categories which 
distinguish the minimum wage which is applicable to an individual (BCEA, 2002).The 
private security sector is of high importance in urban areas. According to the Institute 
for Security Studies since 1994, the major cities in South Africa experienced an 
increase in crime rates. In particular, Johannesburg recorded the highest amount of 
serious crimes, followed by Pretoria, Cape Town and Durban during the period of 
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1994-1999. The study also showed that wealthy urban residents have a higher 
probability of becoming a victim of property crimes (Schönteich and Louw, 2001) 
.The private security sector has grown since 2001, where there has been an 
increase by 111.30 percent of private security officers and an increase of 66.7 
percent of private security companies. A main reason that has been put forward by 
the South African Institute of Race Relations is that citizens do not rely on the police 
for their safety. The growth in this sector is due to urbanization, people and firms 
purchasing their own security which is driven by the dramatic increase in crime rates 
for South Africa (Maritz, 2012). This provides support for an analysis for the security 
sector in urban areas.  Therefore  it may provide evidence on whether the law is 
harmful or beneficial to society. The security sector is dominated by African males 
with less than twelve years of education (Bhorat et al., 2013). The treatment group 
for the security sector is those individuals who are security guards, protective service 
workers and night watchmen. The control group for this sector, following the Bhorat 
et al (2013) methodology, is African and Coloured males in semi-skilled jobs where 
the law is absent, with no more than twelve years of education.  
Table 3.5 below shows that the security sector employs a large proportion of men 
with an average of ten years of schooling, with a composition ranging from 84 
percent to 90 percent, and thus, the control group for the security sector is restricted 
to males with no more than twelve years of schooling.. Also, this sector employs the 
youngest individuals, when compared to the retail and domestic worker sectors. The 
mean age for the security control sector is two to three years older than the 
treatment group. The security sector in KwaZulu-Natal has a diversified employment 
between the races. Here, 86 percent employed are African, and the second largest 
race group employed is Indians. Gauteng and the country statistics show that the 
African race is largely employed in this sector. In contrast, the security sector in the 
Western Cape employs about 40 percent of Africans compared to 55 percent of 
Coloureds. In each province, there is a small but notable proportion of workers who 
are white. In contrast, the control group is dominated by Africans in KwaZulu-Natal 
and Gauteng, and in the Western Cape, it shows larger Coloured employment, 
relative to African employment. Therefore the racial make-up of the control group 
does not match the treatment group as closely as for other sectors. In addition, the 
security control group has approximately 1.5 fewer years of completed education 
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than the control group, on average. The sample size for the security treatment group 
is the smallest of the three sectors, especially so for the Western Cape, which may 
prove problematic for later analysis. 
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Table 3.5 Mean sample characteristics of treatment and control groups: security 
sector 
Variables Western Cape KwaZulu-Natal Gauteng National 
 Security Control Security Control Security Control Security Control 
Age 31.041 34.611 32.636 34.653 31.858 35.058 32.171 35.129 
 (0.741) (0.320) (0.523) (0.295) (0.359) (0.214) (0.261) (0.134) 
Male 0.847 1.000 0.905 1.000 0.895 1.000 0.895 1.000 
 (0.036) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) 
African 0.397 0.337 0.864 0.955 0.905 0.954 0.844 0.854 
 (0.047) (0.015) (0.023) (0.007) (0.016) (0.004) (0.012) (0.004) 
Coloured 0.548 0.663 0.023 0.045 0.020 0.046 0.068 0.146 
 (0.047) (0.015) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
Indian 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.022 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) 
White 0.056 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.066 0.000 
 (0.021) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) 
Years of schooling 10.464 8.673 10.261 8.943 10.489 9.002 10.385 8.767 
 (0.164) (0.081) (0.139) (0.080) (0.12) (0.069) (0.079) (0.040) 
Sample 166 2382 383 2356 499 3470 1314 11259 
Population 60108 809811 229154 1338386 400663 2538631 784532 5692447 
Source: LFS September 2000 – September 2007, own calculations 
Notes: The data are weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample includes non-self-
employed workers aged 15 to 65 in urban areas, who work full time (at least 27 hours per week) 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter provided a detailed description of the Labour Force Survey dataset 
used for the empirical component of this dissertation. Three provinces, namely 
Gauteng, Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, are chosen for the analysis. The 
differences between provinces, such as racial composition and unemployment rates, 
make an argument to assess the law’s impact separately for each province. The 
specific sectors, namely domestic work, retail and private security, are chosen 
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largely due to their relevance as sources of employment in urban areas in these 
provinces. For the analysis, the workers in each separate sector have a 
corresponding control group in order to determine whether other factors, besides the 
law, affected wages and unemployment. The sample was determined by the use of 
Bhorat et al. (2013) methodology for the treatment and control groups. The summary 
statistics show that the control groups are a fairly close match for the treatment 
groups across most sectors and provinces, although small sample sizes in the 
security sector may be a challenge. 
The following chapter discusses the empirical estimation models used to determine 
the wage, employment and compliance estimates, using the above described data. It 
then presents and discusses the findings of these models, comparing the 
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CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PROVINCIAL VARIATIONS 
IN MINIMUM WAGES 
The preceding chapters provided a detailed description of the effects resulting from 
the minimum wage laws, as well as how the laws came into being. The results from 
previous studies showed that employment and wages adjust, to a certain extent, to 
the law, but that the employment changes can be negative or positive depending on 
the nature of the labour market. Compliance with the law also plays a crucial role in 
determining the outcomes of the law. Chapter 3 gave a description of the dataset 
used in the study as well as motivations for the sectors and provinces of analysis. 
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to explain the empirical models used and to 
discuss the results from these models. 
The chapter begins by evaluating the potential effects of the law at a descriptive 
level, by comparing the pre and post law periods. The second section contains the 
results of kernel density graphs as well as the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
tests. This is used to assess wage effects across the full distribution. Section 4.3 
outlines the methodology of compliance, following Bhorat et al. (2012a), and 
presents the results. Thereafter, the difference-in-difference methodology used, 
adapted from Bhorat et al. (2013), is explained. In section 4.5, the results from the 
wage and employment models are presented. Finally, section 4.6 discusses the 
meaning of the findings, while 4.7 concludes the chapter.  
4.1 Descriptive analysis of the impacts of minimum wage laws 
The empirical analysis begins by presenting estimates of how the average labour 
market outcomes have changed between the pre- and post-law periods for the 
treatment and control groups. Descriptive statistics are presented for four labour 
market outcomes: the percentage of workers who are employed full-time, average 
weekly hours worked, and average real and nominal hourly wages. Monthly wages 
were converted to hourly wages using reported hours worked per week, based on 
the assumption that workers work every week in a month. Full-time workers as 
defined by Bhorat et al. (2013) are those who work at least 27 hours per week. 
Furthermore, nominal hourly wages were adjusted using the 2008 CPI to obtain real 
hourly wages. Differences between these labour market variables were estimated for 
each province, as well as for the country as a whole. A t-test to determine whether 
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the pre-law mean for each labour outcome was significantly different to the post-law 
mean was conducted. One, two and three asterisks in the tables below refer to the 
pre-post differences to be significantly different at the ten, five and one percent 
significance levels respectively.  
Recall from Chapter 2 that economic theory suggests, in a perfectly competitive 
covered market (treatment sectors), that full-time employment will decrease as a 
result of the law, in sectors were the minimum wage set was higher than the actual 
wage paid. However, in an uncovered sector (control group sectors), full-time 
employment is said to increase as the newly unemployed seek employment in this 
market, which ultimately leads to a reduction in their wage received. Also, the law is 
implemented in order to ensure an appropriate wage is received for those employed 
in these vulnerable sectors, which would lead to a prediction of higher wages. 
Additionally, one of the other objectives of the law is to keep employment levels 
more or the less the same, between periods, in these sectors, which would lead to 
the hypothesis of the full-time employees to not experience a significant change 
between periods. However, the minima stipulated for part-time workers and full-time 
workers differ. Therefore, a potential effect that may result from the law is that 
employers may tend to decrease working hours offered to employees. This could 
have the effect of lowering the number of full-time workers, but increasing the 
number of part-time workers. The analysis done in this research is restricted to full-
time workers and therefore, does not consider the part-time and full-time types of 
general equilibrium effects. The estimates of the fall in employment resulting from 
the law may therefore overstate the full effect.  
The following section discusses the main results found for these mentioned variables 
for each sector and their respective control groups between periods.  
4.1.1 Domestic work sector 
Table 4.1 shows that there were no significant changes in hours worked throughout 
the comparison of pre and post periods for any region with the exception of Western 
Cape, where it increased significantly by approximately 2.4 hours per week. There 
were no significant changes in the proportion of domestic workers who were 
employed full-time. Nominal hourly wages faced a sizeable and significant increase 
across two provinces, KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, as well as nationally. The 
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KwaZulu-Natal real hourly wage increased from R4.65 to R5.22, which was 
significant at the ten percent level. However, after converting wages into real terms, 
a significantly lower real hourly wage was found in the Western Cape with no other 
significant changes.
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Table 4.1 Mean characteristics: Domestic and Control group 
 
Source: LFS September 2000 – September 2007, own calculations 
Notes: The data are weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample includes non-self-employed workers aged 15 to 65 in urban areas, who work full time 
(at least 27 hours per week).  Post-law means, for each variable which is significantly different from the pre-law means, at the 1 percent (***), (**) 5 percent and (*) 10 
percent levels are shown. 
Variables Western Cape KwaZulu-Natal Gauteng National 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Domestic Control Domestic Control Domestic Control Domestic Control Domestic Control Domestic Control Domestic Control Domestic Control 
Hours per week 31.745 42.755 34.189** 42.638 43.211 45.492 43.133 42.712* 40.084 40.942 38.987 42.610 39.018 43.342 39.350 42.791 
 (1.032) (0.644) (0.681) (0.442) (0.887) (1.369) (0.492) (0.632) (0.649) (1.280) (0.505) (0.468) (0.366) (0.521) (0.277) (0.278) 
Full-time 0.656 0.938 0.696 0.924 0.880 0.920 0.893 0.870 0.818 0.882 0.806 0.947** 0.793 0.906 0.808 0.908 
 (0.033) (0.014) (0.024) (0.011) (0.023) (0.028) (0.012) (0.014) (0.017) (0.028) (0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) 
Nominal hourly wage 6.351 6.003 6.507 6.919** 2.997 5.076 4.256*** 6.524*** 4.601 6.044 6.204*** 7.612*** 3.926 5.304 5.143*** 6.713*** 
 (0.323) (0.244) (0.215) (0.266) (0.176) (0.436) (0.110) (0.265) (0.202) (0.312) (0.272) (0.244) (0.097) (0.148) (0.123) (0.131) 
Real hourly wage 9.821 9.295 8.270*** 8.714 4.648 7.845 5.216* 7.850 7.133 9.349 7.531 9.370 6.083 8.209 6.337 8.258 
 (0.498) (0.378) (0.274) (0.347) (0.274) (0.677) (0.135) (0.315) (0.317) (0.483) (0.298) (0.303) (0.151) (0.229) (0.136) (0.160) 
                 
Sample 327 271 910 1019 434 128 1304 922 777 242 1289 517 2902 1084 5415 3519 
Population 119890 111741 224120 193591 196067 63028 687519 352403 377250 122081 945204 380407 1024936 407137 2350464 1157732 
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Hours worked for the control group did not show significant changes for the Western 
Cape and Gauteng provinces, but showed a 2.8 hour per week decrease in 
KwaZulu-Natal which was significant at the ten percent level. The control group, 
similar to the treatment group, saw significant increases in nominal hourly wages for 
all provinces, as well as nationally. Real hourly wages, for all three provinces and 
nationally, did not experience significant changes between periods. 
At a descriptive level, the minimum wage laws in the domestic sector appear to have 
benefited employees’ of this sector in KwaZulu-Natal by the significant real wage 
increase but harmed these workers in Western Cape by significantly lowering real 
wages received. The control group experienced significant nominal hourly wage 
changes but no other significant changes between periods.  
4.1.2 Retail/Wholesale Sector 
Table 4.2 shows that hours worked across provinces varied, increasing significantly 
by 2.2 hours per week in the Western Cape, but remaining more or less constant in 
Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal. However, the proportion of workers who are employed 
full-time increased significantly in all three provinces, by 7.3, 2.7 and 4.8 percentage 
points respectively. This led to an increase in national full-time employment of retail 
workers of 5.1 percent. Although nominal wages increased significantly throughout, 
real hourly wages for retail workers remained similar to that of pre-law real hourly 
wages. 
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Table 4.2 Mean characteristics: Retail and Control group 
 
Source: LFS September 2000 – September 2007, own calculations 
Notes: The data are weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample includes non-self-employed workers aged 15 to 65 in urban areas, who work full 
time (at least 27 hours per week).  Post-law means, for each variable which is significantly different from the pre-law means, at the 1 percent (***), (**) 5 percent and 
(*) 10 percent levels are shown. 
Variables Western cape KwaZulu-natal Gauteng National 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Retail Control Retail Control Retail Control Retail Control Retail Control Retail Control Retail Control Retail Control 
Hours per week 41.374 43.285 43.586** 43.689 47.097 45.855 46.899 43.719*** 44.934 45.173 45.561 45.405 45.014 44.570 45.960* 44.379 
 (0.762) (0.411) (0.550) (0.313) (0.695) (0.395) (0.530) (0.281) (0.607) (0.294) (0.456) (0.205) (0.335) (0.172) (0.279) (0.135) 
Full-time 0.857 0.921 0.930*** 0.940 0.941 0.942 0.968* 0.900*** 0.908 0.943 0.956*** 0.972*** 0.900 0.923 0.951*** 0.933*** 
 (0.021) (0.010) (0.014) (0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.014) (0.006) (0.010) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) 
Nominal hourly wage 9.468 13.548 11.433*** 12.459* 8.135 11.037 9.647*** 10.346* 10.204 13.444 11.368** 14.058 8.913 11.919 10.305*** 11.925 
 (0.446) (0.520) (0.465) (0.313) (0.374) (0.349) (0.340) (0.223) (0.391) (0.377) (0.433) (0.297) (0.200) (0.191) (0.223) (0.154) 
Real hourly wage 14.302 20.388 14.573 15.819*** 12.249 16.512 11.732 12.629*** 15.304 20.088 14.049 17.294*** 13.404 17.877 12.743 14.748*** 
 (0.671) (0.758) (0.602) (0.397) (0.572) (0.533) (0.399) (0.272) (0.570) (0.549) (0.541) (0.356) (0.297) (0.281) (0.274) (0.185) 
                 
Sample 321 1346 526 2208 356 1370 703 3354 559 2039 711 3171 2047 7721 2783 12301 
Population 146355 614012 144797 638972 183285 743615 449963 1794761 335198 1291232 561058 2659225 905493 3577756 1388902 6166656 
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A key result in this sector is that the retail control group saw a significant increase in 
full-time workers only in Gauteng, whereas the treatment group in all provinces saw 
an increase in full-time employment. Another result to take note of is that the real 
hourly wage for the control group significantly decreased for all three provinces. The 
largest decline in real hourly wages was for the Western Cape, where pre-law real 
hourly wage mean was R20.39 compared to post-law mean wage of R15.82.  
The minimum wage legislation can thus be said to be beneficial to retail sector 
workers in two ways, one being that they are more likely than the control group to 
work full-time after the law was implemented, and two, their real wages remained 
constant while those of the control group fell, meaning that the law appeared to 
protect them against falling wages. 
4.1.3 Security sector 
Security workers worked less hours in the post law period, relative to the pre law 
period, in all provinces and nationally, as shown in Table 4.3. This may be 
interpreted in accordance to the minimum wage law where the legislation stipulates 
the legal amount of working hours per week. Prior to the law, on average, the 
security sector worked approximately 55 hours per week and the introduction of the 
law, made it unlawful to work more than 48 hours per week. However, even post-law, 
all provinces displayed weekly hours of work exceeding 48 hours, but was lower 
compared to the pre-law time frame. Along with this, nominal hourly wages 
increased in Western Cape by R0.77 and KwaZulu-Natal by R2.12 but declined in 
Gauteng by R0.82. A peculiar result is that real hourly wage was lower in post law 
period compared to pre law period. The proportion of security workers working full-
time in the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal decreased by 1.4 percent and 0.3 
percent respectively. However, full-time employment in Gauteng increased by 2.3 
percent and by 1.2 percent nationally. 
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Table 4.3 Mean characteristics: Security and Control group 
Source: LFS September 2000 – September 2007, own calculations 
Notes: The data are weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample includes non-self-employed workers aged 15 to 65 in urban areas, who work full 
time (at least 27 hours per week).  Post-law means, for each variable which is significantly different from the pre-law means, at the 1 percent (***), (**) 5 percent and 
(*) 10 percent levels are shown. 
Variables Western Cape KwaZulu-Natal Gauteng National 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Security Control Security Control Security Control Security Control Security Control Security Control Security Control Security Control 
Hours per week 56.300 43.829 49.747 44.377 55.838 48.079 52.844 46.032*** 54.337 45.571 52.770 45.557 54.514 45.447 52.526** 45.305 
 (1.511) (0.576) (1.273) (0.369) (1.333) (0.575) (0.788) (0.369) (1.095) (0.403) (0.644) (0.228) (0.687) (0.242) (0.428) (0.159) 
Full-time 1.000 0.922 0.986*** 0.950* 0.982 0.965 0.979* 0.937*** 0.962 0.937 0.985 0.977*** 0.972 0.922 0.984 0.948*** 
 (0.000) (0.014) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.012) (0.005) (0.017) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
Nominal hourly wage 8.057 10.496 8.839 10.831 6.659 8.063 8.780** 9.556*** 9.459 9.242 8.639 11.492*** 8.088 8.426 8.458 10.202*** 
 (0.839) (0.415) (0.694) (0.288) (0.674) (0.335) (0.545) (0.251) (0.801) (0.279) (0.348) (0.227) (0.452) (0.153) (0.250) (0.130) 
Real hourly wage 12.402 16.214 11.238 13.852*** 10.341 12.439 10.844 11.687 14.605 14.303 10.718*** 14.275 12.502 13.031 10.514** 12.711 
 (1.315) (0.635) (0.880) (0.372) (1.066) (0.518) (0.661) (0.305) (1.244) (0.427) (0.463) (0.285) (0.703) (0.235) (0.319) (0.162) 
                 
Sample 50 719 116 1651 84 510 301 1828 163 1212 334 2250 438 4057 963 8329 
Population 21137 326617 38970 480739 52243 272910 177692 1059040 105426 704410 293879 1829286 218500 1765180 584582 4169524 
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The control group for the security sector faced an increase in full-time employment, 
post-law, in the Western Cape and Gauteng. The increase in the Western Cape 
security control group full-time employment may be due to the inflow of workers from 
the treatment group who have suffered a lower full-time employment rate.  KwaZulu-
Natal full-time employment declined in post law periods. However, hours worked 
rose in Western Cape and Gauteng by a minimal amount and fell in KwaZulu-Natal 
by two hours per week. Additionally, nominal hourly wages increased across the 
three provinces but real wage rate decreased between pre and post periods, 
although only significantly so for the Western Cape.  
Workers in the security sector, as well as the accompanying control group, therefore 
appear to be harmed by the legislation of minimum wages. However, more detailed 
analysis is required before any strong conclusions are drawn. 
4.2 Distributional analysis 
The tables in the previous section indicate changes in mean characteristics between 
the period before and after the implementation of minimum wage laws. However, 
such averages may obscure changes that occur across the full distribution. This 
section therefore conducts an analysis of the distribution of wages around the 
minimum wage and the variation in the wage distribution over time, using kernel 
density plots. The figures indicate the distribution of the logged nominal and logged 
real hourly wage for each province, with the solid line indication the pre-law 
distribution and the dotted line the post-law distribution. As previously, each 
treatment group is matched with its respective control group. The vertical line serves 
as an indication of the natural logarithm of the value of the real and nominal hourly 
minimum wage when it was first introduced. A spike in the distribution of wages at 
the minimum wage is indicative that the law was binding. In addition to this, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is performed to test for distributional wage differences 
which indicate whether the post-law distribution of wages was significantly different 
from that of pre-law wage distributions. The null hypothesis of this test is that there is 
equality of wage distributions. 
The domestic worker sector and the respective control group’s nominal and real 
hourly wage, for all three provinces are shown in Figure 4.1 and 4.2 respectively. 
The treatment group for all three provinces reveal that for periods after the law, there 
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were a significant number of individuals who did not earn the lawful real and nominal 
wage, at the ten percent level. Furthermore, there is a slight rightward shift of the 
pre-law to post-law nominal wage distribution in Western Cape and Gauteng. 
KwaZulu-Natal, however, shows a large rightward shift in the pre- to post-law 
nominal wage distribution. The results of the equality of nominal wage distribution 
test, displayed in Table 4.4 below, shows that for Western Cape treatment group and 
the control group, the null hypothesis that there was no significant shift of the 
nominal wage distribution between pre- and post-law periods can be rejected at the 
ten percent level of significance. Turning to the real hourly wage distribution, pre-
post periods, and the treatment group for KwaZulu-Natal saw a big rightward shift, a 
small shift in Gauteng, and a leftward shift with more clustering around the minimum 
wage for Western Cape. For real wages, the treatment group changes significantly 
for Gauteng. The control group doesn’t, at the five percent level, but neither does it 
for KwaZulu-Natal at any level. This can be seen graphically by the real wage 
distribution remaining relatively similar between periods. 
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Figure 4.1 Kernel density plots of log of nominal hourly wages: Domestic and control 
 
Source: LFS September 2000 – September 2007, own calculations 
Notes: The data are weighted. The sample includes non-self-employed workers aged 15 to 65 in 
urban areas, who work full time (at least 27 hours per week). The vertical line represents log of the 
nominal hourly minimum introduced in the sector (2008 prices) at the time of introduction.  
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Figure 4.2 Kernel density plots of log of real hourly wages: Domestic and control  
 
Source: LFS September 2000 – September 2007, own calculations 
Notes: The data are weighted. The sample includes non-self-employed workers aged 15 to 65 in 
urban areas, who work full time (at least 27 hours per week). The vertical line represents log of the 
nominal hourly minimum introduced in the sector (2008 prices) at the time of introduction.  
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Table 4.4 Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of equality of distributions (p-values) 
 Nominal Wages Real Wages 
Domestic Sector   
Western Cape 
Domestic 0.092 0.000 
Control 0.002 0.000 
KwaZulu-Natal 
Domestic 0.000 0.000 
Control 0.000 0.798 
Gauteng 
Domestic 0.000 0.000 
Control 0.011 0.063 
Retail Sector 
Western Cape 
Retail 0.005 0.544 
Control 0.051 0.000 
KwaZulu-Natal 
Retail 0.000 0.343 
Control 0.003 0.000 
Gauteng 
Retail 0.003 0.021 
Control 0.000 0.000 
Security Sector   
Western Cape 
Security  0.177 0.051 
Control 0.047 0.000 
KwaZulu-Natal 
Security  0.000 0.043 
Control 0.000 0.111 
Gauteng 
Security  0.089 0.000 
Control 0.000 0.010 
Source: LFS September 2000 – September 2007, own calculations 
Notes: The data are weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample includes non-self-
employed workers aged 15 to 65 in urban areas, who work full time (at least 27 hours per week).  
The wage distributions for the retail treatment and control groups for all three 
provinces are shown below in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. The kernel density plot for the 
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nominal hourly wages, Figure 4.3, for the retail sector in KwaZulu-Natal shows a 
large shift to the right for post-law wage distributions and is supplemented by the 
rejection of the equality of wage distributions. The real hourly wage distributions, 
Figure 4.4, for this sector and province saw a large leftward shift and an upward shift 
of the control group’s wage distribution. The test of equality for real wage 
distributions for the treatment group cannot be rejected at all conventional levels of 
significance, but can be rejected for the control group at all levels of significance. 
However, Gauteng and the Western Cape treatment groups’ wage distribution 
between periods remain fairly similar. The nominal wage distribution for retail 
workers in Gauteng shows a fairly similar pattern between the periods and therefore, 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the one percent significance level. Retail 
workers in Western Cape, according to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, experience no 
significant real hourly wage distribution change between periods. The real hourly 
wage distribution narrows slightly for Gauteng and hence, the equality of wage 
distribution is rejected at the five and ten percent significance levels. For the retail 
control group’s real hourly wage distribution, for all three provinces, the equality of 
real wage distribution is rejected at all conventional significance levels, with the 
kernel density plots showing a rightward shift with a slight narrowing in the wage 
distribution. 
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Figure 4.3 Kernel density plots of log of nominal hourly wages: Retail and control 
 
Source: LFS September 2000 – September 2007, own calculations 
Notes: The data are weighted. The sample includes non-self-employed workers aged 15 to 65 in 
urban areas, who work full time (at least 27 hours per week). The vertical line represents log of the 
nominal hourly minimum introduced in the sector (2008 prices) at the time of introduction.  
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Figure 4.4 Kernel density plots of log of real hourly wages: Retail and control  
 
Source: LFS September 2000 – September 2007, own calculations 
Notes: The data are weighted. The sample includes non-self-employed workers aged 15 to 65 in 
urban areas, who work full time (at least 27 hours per week). The vertical line represents log of the 
nominal hourly minimum introduced in the sector (2008 prices) at the time of introduction.  
 
Finally, Figures 4.5 and 4.6, respectively, show the nominal and real wage 
distributions for the security sector. The data here for the treatment group are quite 
sparse, especially for the pre-law period. Graphically, the security treatment and 
control group for Western Cape and Gauteng’s treatment group do not reflect any 
significant shift of post-law nominal wages. This is supplemented by the non-
rejection of the null hypothesis of wage distribution equality at the five percent 
significance level. In contrast, KwaZulu-Natal security workers and control group 
workers experience a rightward shift of the post-law nominal wage which leads to the 
rejection of the equality of distribution hypothesis at all conventional significance 
levels, with a smaller rightward shift for the control group. The security control group 
in Gauteng also saw a slight rightward shift in the post-law nominal wage distribution 
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at all conventional levels of significance. The real hourly wage for the security 
treatment group for KwaZulu-Natal rejects the null hypothesis of the equality of post-
law distributions at the five percent level, and it can be seen that the wage 
distribution curve becomes less spread out. The corresponding control group in 
KwaZulu-Natal shows no significant change in the post-law wage distribution. Both 
the treatment and control groups for the security sector in Gauteng have a downward 
shift of the post-law real wage distribution, although it is a very small shift for the 
control group. The null hypothesis is rejected at all levels of significance. The 
security sector in Western Cape saw a leftward shift and flattening of the post-law 
real wage distribution, at the ten percent level, and the related control group had a 
similar, but more significant change in their real wage distribution between the 
periods.  
Figure 4.5 Kernel density plots of log of nominal hourly wages: Security and control  
 
Source: LFS September 2000 – September 2007, own calculations 
Notes: The data are weighted. The sample includes non-self-employed workers aged 15 to 65 in 
urban areas, who work full time (at least 27 hours per week). The vertical line represents log of the 
nominal hourly minimum introduced in the sector (2008 prices) at the time of introduction.  
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Figure 4.6 Kernel density plots of log of real hourly wages: Security and control  
 
Source: LFS September 2000 – September 2007, own calculations 
Notes: The data are weighted. The sample includes non-self-employed workers aged 15 to 65 in 
urban areas, who work full time (at least 27 hours per week). The vertical line represents log of the 
nominal hourly minimum introduced in the sector (2008 prices) at the time of introduction.  
 
Overall, therefore, in the Western Cape, each control group, with the exception of the 
domestic worker sector, saw significant decreases in post-law nominal and real 
wages reported in the descriptive statistics. The results presented by the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests support the results obtained from Table 4.4 by showing 
that pre-post wage distributions were different. The KwaZulu-Natal treatment and 
control groups showed significant nominal changes between pre-post periods which 
are shown in Table 4.4and are again supported by the results of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests. The real hourly wage distribution in KwaZulu-Natal was significantly 
different for the domestic worker sector and the retail control group, as supported by 
the kernel density graphs. Nominal wage differences between periods, as shown by 
the test of equality and descriptive statistics, were significantly different for the 
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domestic and retail treatment groups, and for the control groups for the security and 
domestic sector. Evidence for the province’s retail control and security treatment 
group real hourly wage differences between periods is given by the rejection of equal 
wage distributions hypothesis. Therefore it must be concluded that the same wage 
changes were not observed consistently across provinces or across sectors, which 
provides further motivation for the disaggregated analysis conducted in this 
research. 
4.3 Analysis of compliance 
As discussed in the literature review chapter, South Africa is not short of employment 
legislation, but rather, experiences problems such as a lack of compliance. This 
dissertation follows the study undertaken by Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet (2012a) in 
estimating an index as a measure of violation of the law, but does so separately for 
the three sectors as well as for each province. 
Compliance with the law may be visually inspected using kernel density plots or by a 
numerical estimation. Graphically, full compliance can be seen when there is a single 
spike in the wage distribution and no workers that are covered by the law to lie to the 
left of the vertical line, which represents the corresponding lawful wage. It is clear 
from the kernel density plots presented in the previous section that this is not the 
case for South Africa. Instead, large proportions of workers receive wages in 
violation of the law. 
Estimating enforcement/compliance of the law can be done by adopting the Bhorat, 
Kanbur and Mayet (2012a) family of violation indices. This is given by: 
Vα = E {[(wm- w)/wm)]α}         (1) 
In this equation, w represents wages and wm is the respective minimum wage in a 
sector. The index, α, denotes the depth of noncompliance with the law, which is the 
difference between lawful minimum wage and actual wage. Lastly, the expectations 
operator, E, is with respect to wage distribution in the sector to which wm applies. The 
standard measure of violation is when α=0, which is simply the percentage of 
employed and covered individuals who earn below minimum wages. 
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The violation estimates of the minimum wage law are shown in Table 4.5. The 
values in the table show the proportion of workers who are earning below the legal 
hourly rate in each year after the implementation of the law, by sector and province. 
The reported values are based on calculations using the log of real hourly wages 
and the log of real minimum wages for each year per sector. 
Table 4.5. Non-compliance estimates by sector and province 




2002 0.371 0.820 0.604 
2003 0.356 0.683 0.415 
2004 0.214 0.666 0.358 
2005 0.352 0.651 0.424 
2006 0.188 0.557 0.437 




2003 0.335 0.601 0.431 
2004 0.560 0.497 0.473 
2005 0.390 0.481 0.448 
2006 0.403 0.541 0.361 




2002 0.905 0.960 0.917 
2003 0.921 0.909 0.926 
2004 0.948 0.867 0.889 
2005 0.803 0.802 0.949 
2006 0.877 0.874 0.918 
2007 0.898            0.964 0.947 
Source: LFS September 2000 – September 2007, own calculations 
Notes: The data are weighted. The figures show the proportion of workers earning below legal 
minimum wage, for each province and sector, in periods after the law. The sample includes non-self-
employed workers aged 15 to 65 in urban areas, who work full time (at least 27 hours per week).  
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The legal minimum wage for the domestic sector came into effect in 2002. In that 
year, Western Cape employers of domestic workers were more compliant compared 
to the KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng provinces. The proportion of employees in this 
sector earning below the stipulated wage was 37 percent in Western Cape, 60 
percent in Gauteng and 82 percent in KwaZulu-Natal. This indicates that employers 
were slow to react to the introduction of the law, or that enforcement of the law was 
weaker in the earlier years of implementation. However, there was a large decrease 
over time, in non-compliance, from 82 percent in 2002 to 57 percent in 2007, in 
KwaZulu-Natal. In 2007, a larger portion of domestic workers were paid the legal 
wage, as the percentage of individuals earning below the legal wage decreased 
substantially for all three provinces. Stronger enforcement agencies or the 
employers’ decision to comply with the law may be the main influences of the 
change. However, there remain very wide disparities in compliance across the three 
provinces, with Western Cape employers of domestic workers being the most 
complaint for all years.      
The year 2003 saw the retail sector minimum wage law being implemented. For this 
year, 60 percent of retail workers in KwaZulu-Natal earned less than the minimum, 
whereas in the Western Cape, only 33.5 percent were underpaid. The extent of non-
compliance decreased substantially in the first year, especially in KwaZulu-Natal. In 
the Western Cape, higher proportions of workers in this sector were underpaid for 
the years 2004 to 2007 compared to 2003. This could be an indication that there was 
an inflow of workers who were willing to earn less than the minimum. It could also 
suggest that enforcement in this sector and province was weak. KwaZulu-Natal and 
Gauteng, in contrast to the Western Cape, showed that employers’ increased their 
compliance with the law, as 44.7 percent of workers in KwaZulu-Natal and 41.8 
percent of workers in Gauteng, earned below the legal wage in 2007. 
Overall compliance in the security sector for all three provinces was very low, as 
illustrated in the kernel density plots. Even though the Western Cape security sector 
showed that in 2005, a 10.2 percentage point greater proportion of security workers 
earned the minimum wage compared to 2002, the majority of workers did not earn 
the legal wage. Approximately 89.2 percent of security workers in the Western Cape, 
over the six year period, were underpaid. A similar pattern is seen for KwaZulu-Natal 
in 2005 and Gauteng in 2004, where there was an increase in the portion of workers 
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earning the minimum relative to 2002. Non-compliance in the security sector was 
largest for KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, in 2007, where 96.4 percent and 94.7 
percent respectively, of the employed security sector received sub-minimum wages. 
However, these estimates must be treated with some caution due to small sample 
sizes. Nonetheless, these non-compliance estimates are suggestive that there are 
very weak enforcement agencies and that employers in this sector are less willing to 
comply with these laws. Moreover, seeing that the security sector employs younger 
workers relative to the retail and domestic sectors, and that the youth unemployment 
rate in South Africa has been increasing over time, it is perhaps not very surprising if 
workers in this sector are reluctant to report non-compliance of employers. In 
addition to this, young African less-educated males contribute largely to the sectors 
employment, and due to these individuals being seen as providers to their 
households, they may be willing to receive lower than legal wage in order to secure 
income.  
In general, the compliance estimates presented here indicate that there are fairly low 
levels of compliance across all sectors and provinces. According to Bhorat (2014) 
compliance is dependent on several factors that are specific to each labour market. 
In particular, developing countries have low levels of compliance to the minimum 
wage laws. These countries are generally constrained in terms of resources and 
therefore, a measure that simultaneously protects employees and incentivizes firms 
to comply with the law is needed. Factors identified to influence enforcement are: 
institutional factors, individual characteristics of inspectors, firm characteristics and 
local labour market characteristics. Institutional factors relate to number of minima in 
the labour market, the structure of penalties, resource allocation to enforcement 
agencies and awareness of the law. The importance of these factors varies in each 
country. Education, experience and age of inspectors are also key in determining the 
level of enforcement. Firm characteristics regarding firm size, number of previous 
violations, distance from enforcement agencies and if there is foreign ownership also 
have an effect on compliance of employers. Labour market characteristics, such as 
unemployment rates, levels if unionisation and wages relative to the minima are also 
said to determine the level of enforcement.  
In South Africa, there are several sectoral minima that vary according to area of 
work, occupation and hours worked. This makes the minimum wage laws 
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complicated and negatively affect the level of enforcement.  Stanwix (2013) notes 
that there are limited penalties regarding non-compliance of the minimum wage laws, 
which then shows that the penalty structure is not effective to encourage compliance.  
The IES training roadmap (2011) reveals that only 60 percent of inspectors have a 
matric qualification. Therefore, there are inspectors with less than a matric which 
then could negatively affect their ability to conduct inspections accurately. There are 
relatively a few number of labour centres in the country, 127 in 2007 (Bhorat et al, 
2012b). This increases the likelihood that firms are located far from these agencies, 
which then also contributes to the lower levels of compliance and enforcement. It is 
known that South Africa has a high level of unemployment that that increased from 
22 percent in 1994 to 25 percent in 2014 (StatsSA, 2014). This could influence 
employers to pay lower than the lawful minimum as there is an oversupply of 
available workers willing to accept less than the legal wage.   
The estimates presented are not out of line with those presented in Bhorat et al 
(2012a, 2012b). However, this research adds to the understanding of compliance by 
indicating that there is large geographical variation in the extent of compliance, with 
particularly low compliance rates being present in KwaZulu-Natal.  
4.4 Econometric Approach 
The application of Card and Krueger (1995) has been widely used throughout 
economic research on minimum wages. This dissertation specifically employs the 
Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet (2013) econometric model which is adapted from Card 
and Krueger’s (1995) methods and is described below. The two specifications of the 
econometric model are as follows: 
Yikt= β0 +β1POSTt +β2SECTORk + β3POSTt*SECTORk +φj +εijkt   (2) 
The above equation represents the intended equation of use for the analysis of 
wages. The dependent variable, Yikt, is used to evaluate outcomes of wages for an 
individual (i) for time period t, who is in a district council k.  A time dummy, POSTt, is 
included to differentiate between periods before the law and after the law’s 
implementation. The assumption is that the published date in the legislation is the 
date at which the law became binding. Another dummy variable, SECTORk, is used 
to differentiate between the control group and the sector which is affected by 
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minimum wage. If an individual is in the control group, SECTORk=0 and if the 
individual is in the actual sector, SECTORk=1. The average change in the post-law 
period for the employment or wage dependent variable, for the treatment and control 
group is captured by the β1. The coefficient, β2, captures the outcome variable 
differences between the control and treatment groups over the period of analysis. 
The difference-in-difference term is given by POSTt*SECTORk, which estimates the 
effects on the sectors of analysis. The inclusion of this term is based on determining 
if changes in the minimum wage sectors were due to the law, by testing whether or 
not the control groups experienced similar shocks to the treatment group. If the 
control group and sector groups experienced similar effects, then the minimum wage 
cannot be the reason for changes in wages. The coefficient of this term, β3, estimates 
the difference in wages, after the law, between the control group and the sector of 
interest. Additionally, φj represents district level controls where j represents the 
district council. 
Two versions of equation 2 will be estimated. The first will consider the law’s effect 
on the probability of employment in relevant sectors. Here, the dependent variable 
would be equal to one if the individual is employed in the law-affected sector and 0 
otherwise, and the sample will include both currently employed and searching 
unemployed working age individuals. The second version of equation 2 will be 
estimated with the dependent variable being the log of real wages (deflated at the 
2008 CPI) for the control and treatment groups, with both groups being employed. 
In comparison to Bhorat et al (2013), this study will modify equation 2 in order to 
assess the law and its impact across provinces. This is done by estimating the 
equation separately for each province. This will allow for the effect of each variable 
to differ in each province and therefore provide results which are unique to each 
province. 
A further model specification is used to assess the probability of employment 
outcomes while taking into account the variation across district councils in the 
intensity of the law, based on the initial wage of workers in the pre-law period. 
Therefore, equation 3 will produce results that show whether employment 
probabilities have increased in district councils where there was a large pre-law 
wage gap. 
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Yijkt= α0 + α1POSTt + α2GAPjk*SECTORk +α3POSTt*GAPjk*SECTORk + χijkt+ϒijkt (3) 
Where:   GAPjk= (wtmjk– wt-1jk )/ wt-1jk        (4) 
The above equation is used for persons in an individual sector of analysis, which is 
again intended to be estimated for each province separately. Equation 3 is an 
extension of the Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet (2013) study, who estimated the 
equation at a national level. The control group is excluded in the above equation. 
Additionally, this specification does not control directly for district councils. Instead, 
the intensity of the law’s impact is estimated via the term GAPjk, where j represents 
the district council of work and k represents the sector of work. The coefficient α1, 
provides information about the average changes in the outcome variable after the 
implementation of the minimum wage law. The term GAPjk is used to obtain 
deviations of geographic locations of self-reported wages of workers before the law 
was implemented. The α2 coefficient on the GAPjk term measures the outcome 
differences between low GAP and high GAP areas, for each sector, in the post-law 
period. The difference-in-difference coefficient, α3, estimates the outcome changes 
that are due to the law in areas where the GAP term was the largest. Finally, since 
control groups with similar characteristics are not isolated here, worker 
characteristics may vary substantially between individuals in the model, and 
therefore the term χijkt, is used to control for age, gender, education and race.  
The determination of the GAPjk variable is given by equation 4. The term: wtmjk shows 
the initial implementation at time (t) of minimum wages, m, in a sector (k) in a given 
district council (j).Average wages in a sector in a given location one year before the 
law was implemented are given by the term wt-1jk. In areas where average wages 
prior to the law are above average minimum legal wages, GAPjk is set to 0. The GAP 
term is constructed by the use of real, full-time hourly wages. Furthermore, the GAPjk 
variable shows the proportional increase that is necessary for initial wage to equate 
with the minimum wage. It also measures the distinct differences across district 
councils.   
In addition to the mentioned specifications of the estimating equations, an additional 
regression is included in order to test the wage and employment results that were 
retrieved from equation 2 and 3 respectively. This is given as equation 5 below.  
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Yijkt= α0 + α1POSTt + α3POSTt*GAPjk*SECTORk + χijkt+ϒijkt    (5) 
The control group is again excluded from the analysis. The robustness check is done 
by including controls for district councils, which were excluded from equation 4. The 
coefficient of interest in this equation is the one on the difference-in-difference 
variable, POSTt*GAPjk*SECTORk. This is used to examine the impact of the 
minimum wage law on wages. Bhorat et al. (2013) note that this is their preferred 
estimating equation, perhaps because it allows for each district council’s outcome to 
differ, rather than assuming that all of the district effects operate through the wage 
gap.  
In conclusion, the wage response to the law is estimated using equation 2 and 
equation 5, estimated separately by province. This study will attempt to examine the 
response of the probability of employment to the minimum wage law using 
provincially-disaggregated estimations of equation 3 and equation 5.  The choice of 
these particular equation specifications is for purposes of comparison with the 
findings of Bhorat et al. (2013). 
4.5 Econometric results  
The econometric methods described above, with two difference-in-difference 
specifications, are used to examine the effects of the minimum wage law on the 
relevant sectors. Two potential outcomes of the law are evaluated, namely the 
employment probability and wage level effects.  
4.5.1 Probability of employment 
The results of the difference-in-difference empirical model for the probability of 
employment are shown in Tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8.  Each sector analysed in each of 
the three provinces is estimated by equation 3 and equation 5, which are presented 
in the table as specification I and II respectively. Equation 3 shows the estimates of 
the employment equation, for each sector in each province, with the inclusion of 
individual level controls and the gap variable. For the second equation, the individual 
level controls as well as district council level controls are included, but the gap 
variable is omitted. For both models, the dependent variable is a dummy variable 
which is equal to 1 if the individual is employed in the covered sectors and equal to 0 
otherwise, and is estimated using a probit model. Additionally, the sample used for 
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the employment regression includes those individuals who are demographically 
similar to those in the treatment group, and those who are of working-age and 
seeking employment. In other words, the sample contains employed individuals who 
are covered by the law in the specific sector, those employed in other sectors and 
those who are looking for work but currently unemployed.  
The first employment model specification for domestic, retail and security workers in 
all three provinces, shows that the post law coefficients are large, positive and 
significant at the one percent level. This can be interpreted as there being a higher 
probability of employment in all of the respective sectors, across all three provinces, 
after the implementation of the law. The GAPjk coefficients for the domestic worker 
sector in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng are positive and significant at the one and ten 
percent levels respectively. This is an indication that there was a higher likelihood of 
employment in the domestic worker sector, in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, in those 
district councils where wages earned were far below the stipulated minimum. 
However, the wage gap coefficient for the domestic worker sector in the Western 
Cape yields an insignificant result. Similarly, the Western Cape wage gap variable 
for the security and retail sectors also show insignificant results. In contrast, the 
GAPjk coefficient for KwaZulu-Natal retail and security workers reflect a large, 
positive and significant result, at the ten percent level. The security wage gap in 
Gauteng was also large and significant at the ten percent level. This is also an 
indication that the probabilities of employment in these two sectors were higher, in 
district councils that had the lowest wages compared to the minimum wage set. In 
Gauteng, the coefficient for the retail workers wage gap variable was negative. The 
negative gap coefficient suggests that there was a lower employment probability in 
those district councils that faced lower pre-law wages than the post-law wages. 
However, this result is not significant.  
The interaction term between the wage gap and post-law variable measures the 
law’s effect in periods after the law in district councils where the law was most 
binding. The domestic worker sector in Western Cape showed a negative and 
significant result at the five percent level, but a positive and significant result at the 
ten percent level for KwaZulu-Natal and an insignificant result for Gauteng. The 
negative coefficient implies that security workers in district councils in the Western 
Cape where the pre-wage gap was larger faced a lower probability of employment in 
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post law periods, relative to those in district councils with a lower pre-law wage gap, 
with the opposite effect in KwaZulu-Natal.  
The second specification of the probit model for the employment response to the 
minimum wage law shows a positive coefficient for the post-law variable across all 
three provinces and across all three sectors, which is significant at the one percent 
level. Controlling for the district council in which someone resides, this again means 
that in periods after the law was implemented; there was a higher chance of 
employment in the domestic, retail and security sector in Western Cape, KwaZulu-
Natal and Gauteng than in the pre-law period. The coefficients of the interaction 
term, of the post and the gap variable, for the domestic worker group in Western 
Cape and Gauteng are insignificant, whereas it is negative in KwaZulu-Natal. This 
negative coefficient is significant at the five percent level and indicates that domestic 
workers in district councils where the pre-law gap was larger faced a lower 
probability of employment in post law periods, relative to those in district councils 
with a lower pre-law wage gap. The security sector in the Western Cape, KwaZulu-
Natal and Gauteng resulted in similar negative coefficients on the interaction terms. 
In contrast, the retail sector post-law wage gap interaction terms were insignificant 
for all provinces. 
The F-statistic indicates the result of the overall significance of the empirical model. 
The null hypothesis is that all regression coefficients are equal to zero. The p-values 
of 0.00 for all of the sector-province employment probability models indicate that all 
of the models have a significant degree of explanatory power. 
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Table 4.6 Probability of employment: Domestic sector 
Source: LFS September 2000 – September 2007, own calculations 
Notes: The data are weighted. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the person is working in the relevant sector and equal to 0 if 
not. The sample consists of working-age persons, with no more than a matric level of education, in employment or in search of work. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Controls for individual characteristics include controls for race, years of education and gender. 
The wage gap determines the relative rise in the real wages in district council i at time t-1 required to meet the minimum wage at time t. The F-statistic 
refers to the test for the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are equal to zero. 
Variables Western Cape KwaZulu-Natal Gauteng 
 Specification I Specification II Specification I Specification II Specification I Specification II 
Postlaw 0.340*** 0.450*** 0.284*** 0.849*** 0.351*** 0.512*** 
 (0.073) (0.089) (0.068) (0.087) (0.047) (0.049) 
Gap_Domestic 0.134  0.259***  0.398*  
 (0.252)  (0.097)  (0.231)  
Post_Gap_Domestic -0.827** -0.441 0.413*** -0.359** 0.134 0.007 
 (0.407) (0.421) (0.144) (0.159) (0.403) (0.401) 
Constant 0.674*** 1.181*** -0.014 -0.094 0.862*** 0.723*** 
 (0.121) (0.195) (0.080) (0.113) (0.076) (0.109) 
       
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Sample 9500.00 9494.00 10949.00 10936.00 11653.00 11646.00 
Population 2978383.41 2975186.50 5827408.80 5824450.26 8629918.31 8616022.06 
F Statistic 62.09 13.05 135.84 29.40 136.88 35.60 
P-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 4.7 Probability of employment: Retail sector  
 
Source: LFS September 2000 – September 2007, own calculations 
Notes: The data are weighted. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the person is working in the relevant sector and equal to 0 if not. 
The sample consists of working-age persons, with no more than a matric level of education, in employment or in search of work. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Controls for individual characteristics include controls for race, years of education and gender. The wage 
gap determines the relative rise in the real wages in district council i at time t-1 required to meet the minimum wage at time t. The F-statistic refers to the 
test for the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are equal to zero. 
Variables Western Cape KwaZulu-Natal Gauteng 
 Specification I Specification II Specification I Specification II Specification I Specification II 
Postlaw 0.246*** 0.364*** 0.509*** 0.640*** 0.250*** 0.434*** 
 (0.055) (0.058) (0.049) (0.047) (0.040) (0.038) 
Gap_Domestic 0.139  0.659***  -0.125  
 (0.163)  (0.173)  (0.216)  
Post_Gap_Domestic 0.055 0.117 -0.418 -0.523 -0.109 -0.156 
 (0.279) (0.335) (0.346) (0.356) (0.378) (0.356) 
Constant -2.338*** -2.359*** -2.387*** -2.490*** -1.895*** -2.257*** 
 (0.123) (0.172) (0.091) (0.103) (0.080) (0.107) 
       
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Sample 9522.00 9467.00 10949.00 10903.00 11653.00 11653.00 
Population 2987359.04 2925016.91 5827408.80 5807329.89 8629918.31 8629918.31 
F Statistic 12.35 5.55 33.58 10.94 10.93 8.47 
P-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 4.8 Probability of employment: Security sector 
 
 
Source: LFS September 2000 – September 2007, own calculations 
Notes: The data are weighted. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the person is working in the relevant sector and equal to 0 if 
not. The sample consists of working-age persons, with no more than a matric level of education, in employment or in search of work. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Controls for individual characteristics include controls for race, years of education and gender. 
The wage gap determines the relative rise in the real wages in district council i at time t-1 required to meet the minimum wage at time t. The F-statistic 
refers to the test for the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are equal to zero. 
Variables Western Cape KwaZulu-Natal Gauteng 
 Specification I Specification II Specification I Specification II Specification I Specification II 
Postlaw 0.549*** 0.939*** 0.552*** 1.061*** 0.570*** 0.734*** 
 (0.110) (0.161) (0.073) (0.087) (0.069) (0.076) 
Gap_Domestic 0.216  0.140***  0.406***  
 (0.198)  (0.029)  (0.083)  
Post_Gap_Domestic -0.438 -1.734*** -0.055 -1.112*** -0.495** -0.869** 
 (0.286) (0.569) (0.075) (0.256) (0.213) (0.397) 
Constant -3.962*** -3.383*** -3.488*** -4.167*** -3.510*** -3.773*** 
 (0.235) (0.311) (0.153) (0.170) (0.164) (0.191) 
       
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Sample 9500.00 8501.00 10949.00 10618.00 11653.00 11584.00 
Population 2978383.41 2389660.24 5827408.80 5640526.37 8629918.31 8572566.56 
F Statistic 13.34 7.13 30.22 15.48 25.47 10.52 
P-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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4.5.2 Wage regressions 
The second outcome of interest is the response of wage levels to the minimum wage 
law. Two difference-in-difference models were estimated in order to determine the 
law’s effect on wages. This empirical estimation method is used for two purposes. 
First, it aims to determine if the law had an impact on workers who were covered by 
the legislation relative to those who were not, and secondly, to compute the 
differential effect of the stipulated wage in district councils where pre-law wages of 
the corresponding sector were further below the minimum. The dependent variable 
for both specifications was the log of real hourly earnings, adjusted for inflation to 
2008 prices. Following the recommendations of Bhorat et al (2013), both 
specifications include individual level and district controls. The first model includes 
the treatment group and the control group for the relevant sectors. The results 
obtained from this model compare the wages of workers in the covered sector to 
wages of workers in the corresponding control group. The second estimation 
equation includes only covered workers, and therefore excludes the sector dummy 
and wage gap variable. The interaction term of the post law and gap variable 
remains as an important factor that indicates whether wages increased more in 
district councils where the pre-law wage gap was the biggest.  
Tables 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11shows the results of the log of real hourly wages for each 
province and sector, according to these two alternative wage equations. From the 
first specification, the post law variable for the domestic worker sector in Western 
Cape and Gauteng has a negative coefficient which is significant at the five percent 
level. This implies that real hourly wages for workers in the domestic work and 
control group decreased by 11.49 percent and 13.41 percent (converting from log 
points) for the Western Cape and Gauteng respectively, after the law compared to 
before the law. KwaZulu-Natal workers also show a decrease of real hourly wages in 
the post-law period; however, this result is insignificant. Post-law coefficients for the 
retail sector are negative and insignificant in the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal 
but zero for Gauteng. Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal security and control group 
workers also experienced a decline in their post-law real hourly wages, by 8.15 
percent and 9.70 percent respectively, compared to their pre-law wages, significant 
at the one and five percent levels, respectively.  
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Retail workers in all three provinces had lower real hourly wages, by an average of 
15.90 percent, compared to the respective control group, at the one percent 
significance level. Similarly, security workers in all three provinces also had 
significantly lower wages by an average of 23.49 percent relative to their control 
groups. Domestic workers in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng also had significantly 
lower wages than the control group. For domestic workers, the difference–in-
difference estimator, interaction term is positive and significant at the ten percent 
level only in Gauteng. This implies that the domestic worker group in post law 
periods experienced an increase in real hourly wages, compared to the pre-law 
wage of their corresponding control group. A similar result is found for the retail 
group in Western Cape and the security sector in KwaZulu-Natal, significant at the 
five and ten percent level respectively. In contrast to this, security workers in 
Gauteng were estimated to experience a significantly lower real hourly wage, at the 
five percent level, compared to pre-law wages of their control group.   
As discussed previously, the second specification for the wage level effect of the 
minimum wage law excludes the sector dummy variable and the interaction term of 
the post-sector variable, and instead restricts the sample to the treatment group only 
and includes the interaction term of the post-wage-gap variable. The domestic 
worker and retail worker groups for all three provinces reflect no significant change in 
real wages for pre-post periods. However, for the security sector, the post-law 
coefficient is large and negative for KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, at the one and five 
percent significance levels respectively. This implies that the real hourly wage 
declined by 49.44 percent for security workers in KwaZulu-Natal between periods, 
and decreased by 24.57 percent for security workers in Gauteng. This further 
supports the results from the first wage equation, which estimates that real hourly 
wages for the sector declined between pre and post law periods. However, as 
discussed previously, the security sector results should be treated with caution due 
to small sample sizes. The province of KwaZulu-Natal showed significant and 
positive coefficients on the interaction term for the domestic, retail and security 
sectors. This is suggestive that district councils with larger wage-gaps experienced 
larger increases in real hourly wages in periods after the law. In contrast, this 
interaction term was positive but insignificant for the Western Cape domestic, retail 
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and security sectors. Gauteng’s interaction term between the post and wage gap 
variables showed insignificant results for all three sectors.  
As was the case for the employment models, the p-values for the sector-province 
wage models, for both specifications I and specification II, are indicative that the 
wage models have a significant degree of explanatory power. 
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Table 4.9 Log of real hourly earnings: Domestic sector 
Source: LFS September 2000 – September 2007, own calculations 
Notes: The data are weighted. The dependent variable is the log of the real hourly wage for full-time employees. Full-time employees are those who report 
working no less than 27 hours per week. The sample consists of working-age persons who are not self-employed. Specification I uses a sample that 
includes the treatment and the control group. Specification II uses a sample which consists of workers that are employed in the relevant sector. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Controls for individual characteristics include controls for race, years of education and gender. 
The wage gap determines the relative rise in the real wages in district council i at time t-1 required to meet the minimum wage at time t. The F-statistic 
refers to the test for the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are equal to zero. 
Variables Western Cape KwaZulu-Natal Gauteng 
 Specification I Specification II Specification I Specification II Specification I Specification II 
Postlaw -0.122** -0.117 -0.112 -0.105 -0.144** -0.059 
 (0.054) (0.075) (0.080) (0.084) (0.060) (0.041) 
Domestic -0.036  -0.522***  -0.392***  
 (0.060)  (0.074)  (0.056)  
Post_Domestic -0.009  0.128  0.129*  
 (0.071)  (0.086)  (0.067)  
Post_Gap_Domestic  0.255  0.291**  -0.004 
  (0.326)  (0.125)  (0.297) 
Constant 1.882*** 1.796*** 1.937*** 2.195*** 2.134*** 1.830*** 
 (0.121) (0.173) (0.075) (0.208) (0.118) (0.119) 
       
R-Squared 0.106 0.125 0.154 0.081 0.101 0.069 
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample 2498.00 1215.00 2749.00 1725.00 2775.00 2037.00 
Population 641330.81 338628.60 1285988.30 878734.11 1789526.78 1303374.98 
F Statistic 5.65 2.60 8.56 10.10 10.25 5.38 
P-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 4.10 Log of real hourly earnings: Retail sector 
 
Source: LFS September 2000 – September 2007, own calculations 
Notes: The data are weighted. The dependent variable is the log of the real hourly wage for full-time employees. Full-time employees are those who 
report working no less than 27 hours per week. The sample consists of working-age persons who are not self-employed. Specification I uses a sample 
that includes the treatment and the control group. Specification II uses a sample which consists of workers that are employed in the relevant sector. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Controls for individual characteristics include controls for race, years of education 
and gender. The wage gap determines the relative rise in the real wages in district council i at time t-1 required to meet the minimum wage at time t. 
The F-statistic refers to the test for the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are equal to zero. 
Variables Western Cape KwaZulu-Natal Gauteng 
 Specification I Specification II Specification I Specification II Specification I Specification II 
Postlaw -0.043 0.038 -0.046 -0.000 0.000 -0.019 
 (0.036) (0.062) (0.036) (0.074) (0.028) (0.059) 
Retail -0.213***  -0.159***  -0.149***  
 (0.047)  (0.045)  (0.039)  
Post_retail 0.140**  0.058  0.050  
 (0.063)  (0.058)  (0.058)  
post_gap_retail  0.044  -0.372*  -0.655 
  (0.416)  (0.208)  (0.435) 
Constant 1.895*** 2.073*** 1.798*** 1.900*** 2.607*** 2.418*** 
 (0.088) (0.150) (0.201) (0.127) (0.166) (0.252) 
       
R-squared 0.286 0.186 0.260 0.207 0.251 0.196 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample 4314.00 817.00 5065.00 1020.00 6377.00 1229.00 
Population 1513515.37 278200.89 2935722.09 608039.04 4781773.29 870959.77 
F statistic 23.91 3.47 37.26 6.39 41.74 7.90 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 4.11 Log of real hourly earnings: Security sector 
 
Source: LFS September 2000 – September 2007, own calculations 
Notes: The data are weighted. The dependent variable is the log of the real hourly wage for full-time employees. Full-time employees are those who 
report working no less than 27 hours per week. The sample consists of working-age persons who are not self-employed. Specification I uses a sample 
that includes the treatment and the control group. Specification II uses a sample which consists of workers that are employed in the relevant sector. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Controls for individual characteristics include controls for race, years of education 
and gender. The wage gap determines the relative rise in the real wages in district council i at time t-1 required to meet the minimum wage at time t. 
The F-statistic refers to the test for the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are equal to zero. 
Variables Western Cape KwaZulu-Natal Gauteng 
 Specification I Specification II Specification I Specification II Specification I Specification II 
Postlaw -0.085* -0.260 -0.102** -0.682*** 0.011 -0.282** 
 (0.044) (0.187) (0.052) (0.210) (0.032) (0.123) 
Security -0.403***  -0.266***  -0.150**  
 (0.083)  (0.079)  (0.062)  
Post_Security 0.069  0.154*  -0.175**  
 (0.104)  (0.090)  (0.071)  
Post_Gap_Security  0.543  1.484***  0.436 
  (0.721)  (0.441)  (0.382) 
Constant 2.229*** 1.615*** 0.813*** 2.812*** 1.890*** 2.460*** 
 (0.166) (0.385) (0.147) (0.260) (0.142) (0.076) 
       
R-Squared 0.213 0.231 0.124 0.206 0.082 0.240 
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample 2505.00 162.00 2531.00 383.00 3927.00 492.00 
Population 854805.09 58735.28 1497080.17 229153.77 2912030.51 396310.60 
F Statistic 55.14 1.65 27.77 2.29 234.13 3.08 
P-Value 0.00 0.0407 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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4.6 Discussion 
This section aims to consolidate the findings of the empirical work conducted in this 
chapter, and draw out the meaning of the key results in each sector and province. 
Table 4.12 Summary of regression findings: estimated difference-in-difference effect 
 Western Cape KwaZulu-Natal Gauteng 
Sector Model Employment Wages Employment Wages Employment Wages 
Domestic I Negative None Positive None None Positive 
 II None None Negative Positive None None 
Retail I None Positive None None None None 
 II None None None Negative None None 
Security I None None None Positive Negative Negative 
 II Negative None Negative Positive Negative None 
Source: LFS September 2000 – September 2007, own calculations 
Notes:  Summary of results from Tables 4.6 to Table 4.11.The data are weighted. 
 
4.6.1 Employment 
The results from two specifications of the empirical models of the probability of 
employment indicated that there was a higher probability of domestic employment in the 
post-law periods, across all provinces. According to economic theory, if the legal 
minimum wage is higher than the actual wage paid, employment in the sector will 
decrease. However, in the domestic worker sector in South Africa, there was an 
increase in females being employed into the full-time domestic worker sector. This may 
be explained by the fact that the full-time wages are lower than part-time wages and 
employers may respond by increasing the working hours to compensate for the wage 
paid. This would result in more working hours and hence, more domestic workers being 
classified as full-time workers. As a result, there was an increase in female domestic 
worker employment in post-law periods. Another reason for this would be that the law 
created an incentive for employers to pay higher than pre-period wages, in order to 
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avoid violation penalties, which may have enticed more females into domestic work. 
Furthermore, this result may be due to the formalization of the domestic worker sector, 
whereby it was mandated that employment contracts were drawn up between employer 
and employee. The first probability of employment equation indicates that there was an 
increase in the probability of domestic employment for district councils located in 
KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng where pre-law earnings were lower than the lawful-
minimum. One possible response of employers would be to decrease working hours in 
response to the wage increase. Perhaps more people are working in domestic work, but 
their hours have decreased. However, the descriptive statistics presented in Table 4.1 
suggested no significant decreases in average hours worked. In KwaZulu-Natal, in large 
pre-post wage gap district councils, individuals faced a lower probability of being 
employed in domestic work than in district councils with a low pre-post wage gap. The 
reasoning behind this may be due to employers’ reluctance to hire domestic workers at 
a much higher wage, since the pre-law wage was significantly lower than legislated 
minimum.    
The probability of employment in the period after the law, for the retail sector, increased 
compared to the period prior to the law. This holds true for all three provinces analysed. 
The related control group faced similar increases in full-time employment rates across 
the Western Cape and Gauteng provinces. An explanation for this may be linked to the 
lower nominal and real hourly wages, as shown by the kernel density plots. The wage-
gap variable from the first specification of the probability of employment model shows 
that in KwaZulu-Natal, in district councils where pre-law wage was lower than minimum 
wage, there was an increase in the probability of retail employment. This may be an 
indication that the demand for retail workers increased after the law, possibly due to the 
increased amount of disposable income for workers in the area resulting from the 
increased wage, which stimulated extra consumption of goods and services, and hence, 
required more retail services.   
Turning to the security sector, the probability of employment models showed that there 
was an increase in the likelihood of security employment in the Western Cape, 
KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng. Due to the high unemployment rates, certain individuals 
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may be willing to accept the wage offered in the post law period and enter the security 
sector. The wage-gap coefficients were positive in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, which 
indicates that security employment in areas where pre-law wages were much lower than 
the legal wage increased by more than in smaller-gap areas. It is most likely that this 
occurred due to the inflow of young job-seekers to the security sector, some of whom 
may be willing to receive lower than legal wage. This reasoning is supported by the high 
non-compliance estimates for all three provinces, which indicate that employers pay 
below the legal wage, perhaps in order to meet the high demand for security 
employment. However, the second probit employment model showed that the security 
workers in high pre-post wage gap areas had a lower chance of employment in post-law 
periods relative to that of workers in areas with a low pre-post wage gap. Employers in 
high wage gap areas may be less willing to adjust previous wages because they may 
not be able to financially afford it. Also, the lower employment probability can be said to 
be due to the fact that, as there are more employees that earn sub-minimum wages, the 
chances of the employer being reported to the DoL rises, which then creates a 
disincentive to employ security workers at sub-minimum wage. 
4.6.2 Wage levels 
In KwaZulu-Natal, real hourly wages in the post-law period increased, but decreased in 
the Western Cape. A possible explanation for this is that a much larger proportion of 
employers of domestic workers in this province paid the above-minimum wage prior to 
its introduction. The empirical wage model shows that real hourly wages for the 
domestic sector declined in the post-law period in Western Cape and Gauteng, which 
may be indicative that employers in these provinces lowered wages in the post-law 
period because they paid higher than legal minimum for periods before the law. This is 
supported by the kernel density plots, which show a large part of the pre-law distribution 
located above the minimum wage in these two provinces. The second wage model 
shows that areas in KwaZulu-Natal with large domestic real hourly wage gaps were 
associated with larger post-law wage increases. The post-law wage increases are 
consistent with attempts at compliance with the law by employers, and are supported by 
the increased compliance estimates over time in this province.  
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Real hourly wages in post-law periods for the Western Cape were lower than pre-law 
wages, while there was little change in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng for the control 
group between periods. The empirical models for wage levels revealed that the 
domestic worker sector real hourly wage was significantly lower than their respective 
control group in pre-law periods in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, but increased in 
Gauteng and remained similar in KwaZulu-Natal in post-law periods. The post-law 
dummy variable is negative and significant for Western Cape and Gauteng in 
specification I, which means that the control group wages went down. Examination of 
the difference-in-difference variable for Gauteng showed that the treatment group in the 
post-law period felt an increase in their real hourly wage relative to pre-law wages of the 
domestic control group, which may be a beneficial effect of the law. The law increased 
earnings for the sector, and therefore met its required objective, but only in this 
province. 
Descriptive statistics for the retail sector showed similar real hourly wages for Western 
Cape, but lower real post-law wages for KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng. Due to the lower 
hours worked for KwaZulu-Natal, retail employees’ lower real hourly wage could be due 
to monthly wages being lowered by more than the decrease in hours worked. 
Supplemented by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal 
workers did not experience a significant change in the pre-post wage distribution, 
perhaps because the minimum wage was set close to pre-law average wages. 
However, Gauteng retail workers saw a change in the post-law wage distribution and 
this is likely to be largely due to the increased compliance of employers with the law.  
Within the three provinces, the regressions show that the treatment group of retail 
workers received a lower wage than their control group in pre-law periods, but higher 
wages in post-law periods which may be a positive side-effect of the law. Additionally, 
retail workers in the Western Cape saw a rise in real hourly wages, post-law, compared 
to their control group’s pre-law wages, although the same was not true for the other 
provinces. The wage level equation which contains the interaction the post-law and 
wage-gap variable suggests that districts in KwaZulu-Natal with large wage-gaps 
increased their real hourly post-law wages by more than those with smaller gaps. Again, 
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this can perhaps be attributed to employers’ compliance with the law. The retail control 
group faced lower real and nominal wages in post-law periods. Wage adjustments were 
minimal in this sector and for the control group; therefore, there was no significant 
change in the overall wage distribution. 
An interesting result is that the real hourly wage for all provinces was lower in post-law 
periods, which suggests that the law may have harmed the security sector. For the 
years 2005 and 2006 in Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, it is apparent by the non-
compliance estimates that fewer security workers, compared to the year 2002, earned 
less than the minimum. However, for all years and provinces, estimates show that an 
average of 90 percent of these workers did not receive the legal wage. Security workers 
in the Western Cape did not show a significant shift of post-law real wage distribution, 
supported by the non-rejection of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov hypothesis. Kernel density 
plots of KwaZulu-Natal’s and Gauteng’s security sector real hourly wage showed 
significant changes in pre-post real wage distribution. However, these changes do not 
shift the distribution upwards, and cannot be attributed to compliance of employers as 
non-compliance estimates are high and do not improve much over time.  
Specification I of the wage level equation shows that for all three provinces, the security 
sector received lower real hourly wages in the period after the law relative to the control 
group. Thereafter, in the post-law periods, the control group wages decrease in Western 
Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. However, the security sector in KwaZulu-Natal experienced a 
decrease in their wages but the sector experienced an increase in Gauteng, which is 
shown by the interaction term. Specification II of the wage equation suggested that in 
KwaZulu-Natal, where large wage gaps were observed, and the sector experienced an 
increase in their real hourly post-law wage. However, the compliance estimates suggest 
that this increase was not large enough to meet the lawful minimum. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter conducted the empirical analysis of the effects of minimum wage laws on 
two economic outcomes, namely employment and wages, across the three provinces 
and three sectors. The chapter began by showing that there were some significant 
changes in average outcomes, and in the full distribution of wages, between the pre-law 
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and post-law periods. However, these changes were not uniform across sectors and 
provinces, and nor were all of the changes beneficial for workers. 
The chapter went on to outline the econometric models for these two outcomes, 
following the difference-in-difference specifications of Bhorat et al (2013). The 
employment probability models showed an overall increased likelihood of employment 
in the analysed sectors, for all three provinces. Areas with large wage gaps, in general, 
showed an ambiguous effect for each of the provinces and sectors. KwaZulu-Natal 
domestic workers, and security sector workers in all three provinces, faced a lower 
chance of employment in areas where there were large differences between pre-post 
wages. Retail and security sector employment chances increased in periods after the 
law; however, for the security sector specifically, wages were far below the stipulated 
minimum which is indicative of low compliance by employers. 
The real hourly wage level for post-law periods increased in KwaZulu-Natal but 
decreased for Gauteng and Western Cape for the domestic sector. The second wage 
model shows that areas in KwaZulu-Natal with large domestic real hourly wage gaps 
were associated with larger post-law wage increases. The difference-in-difference 
variable for domestic workers in Gauteng showed that in the post-law periods, there 
was an increase in their real hourly wage relative to pre-law wages of the domestic 
control group, which may be a beneficial effect of the law. The wage level equation 
which contains the interaction between the post-law and wage-gap variable, suggests 
that districts in KwaZulu-Natal with larger wage gaps increased their real hourly post-
law wages by more than those with smaller gaps. The retail sector for Western Cape 
and KwaZulu-Natal did not experience real hourly wage changes, whereas the retail 
workers in Gauteng did experience increases.  Security sector real hourly wages in 
post-law periods were lower when compared to pre-law periods. Additionally, KwaZulu-
Natal and Gauteng saw significant improvements between periods, while wage 
distributions were unchanged in the Western Cape.  
It is apparent from the analysis in this chapter that the minimum wage law has different 
effects for different provinces, and therefore this provides support for the analysis of 
provincial minimum wage effects. National-level studies are able only to discern the 
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aggregate outcomes, whereas this dissertation has highlighted some of the provincial 
variations in compliance, employment and wages. The final chapter gives an overall 
summary of the objectives that were met in this study, and makes suggestions for 
further research in this field.  
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
The minimum wage policy and its effects have been widely explored by researchers in 
developing and developed countries. The purpose of the law is said to be to protect the 
most vulnerable workers in an economy, by making it unlawful to pay lower than 
subsistence wage. Such laws were initially put into practice in New Zealand, Australia, 
U.K and the U.S more than a century ago. South Africa introduced a minimum wage law 
in 2001, with the minima differing by sector and area of employment. The purpose of 
this dissertation was to examine the law’s effects across three provinces which 
contribute to the majority of economic activity in the country, but have different political, 
demographic and economic structures. 
Specific minimum wages are allocated to eleven sectors which are regarded as 
vulnerable, as outlined in the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. Workers in these 
sectors are generally low-paid and low-educated people who are living in poverty. The 
minimum wage differs for each sector, where it is then further differentiated by job type, 
location and hours worked. The Employment Conditions Committee was founded to 
ensure the application of the law.  
Economic theory, as outlined in chapter 2, suggests that the minimum wage is regarded 
as a price floor. A labour market which is perfectly competitive may, in response to the 
increased mandatory wage, result in unemployment. Unemployed workers may then 
move into an uncovered sector, which may lower wages in order to accommodate the 
extra number of workers. However, a monopsony-type labour market shows that there 
can be increased employment due to the law. A positive effect of the law would suggest 
that it protects the most vulnerable workers from earning less than a living wage. 
Stigler (1946) was one of the first authors to evaluate the minimum wage laws and its 
effect on wages, employment and poverty. In general, his study put forward that the law 
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will have negative effects on employment. In contrast, other authors found no such 
negative relationship (Lester, 1960; Card and Krueger, 1993). Addison and Blackburn 
(1999) found that an increase in the minimum wage results in a decrease in the poverty 
rate and positive employment effects. In comparison to the competitive market model, a 
monopsony market also found no negative relationship between the law and 
employment (Dickens et al, 1999).  
Studies conducted in developing countries can be seen to have some different effects 
relative to that of the developed countries. Costa Rica’s minimum wage had a negative 
effect on employment and hours worked due to the law, which affected unskilled 
workers the most (Gindling and Terrell, 2006). However, for Brazil, there was no effect 
on employment due to the law (Lemos, 2009). Turning to studies conducted in South 
Africa, a lower employment rate was found due to the law by Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet 
(2013), but the law was shown to be beneficial to vulnerable workers in specific sectors 
(Millea, 2012). Theory relating compliance of employers with the law predicts that, if the 
lawful wage is above equilibrium wage, then non-compliance by employers is more 
probable. A US study found that wages in both covered and uncovered sectors are 
affected when there is incomplete compliance to the laws (Ashenfelter and Smith, 
1979). Ronconi (2010) predicted compliance to be positively related to the number of 
compliance officers and In South Africa, there was evidence of substantial non-
compliance by employers (Bhorat et al, 2012a). 
For this study, data were pooled from eight waves of the September Labour Force 
Survey for the years 2000-2007. The sectors analysed were the domestic worker, retail 
and security sectors. In addition, control groups for each sector were identified. These 
control groups had similar characteristics to that of the treatment group. The provinces 
examined were Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, as these provinces are the 
largest urban areas in the country. Using this dataset, empirical models were estimated 
for compliance, employment probabilities and wages for pre-post law periods. 
The first research question of the dissertation was to assess the extent of compliance 
with minimum wage legislation within affected sectors and how this differs between 
provinces. Estimates of non-compliance by employers were found using the 
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methodology of Bhorat et al. (2012a). Non-compliance estimates were largest for the 
security sector, but employers in the retail and domestic sector increased their extent of 
compliance with the law over time. Western Cape has the lowest non-compliance 
estimates for all three sectors analysed, followed by Gauteng and then KwaZulu-Natal. 
 The second and third research questions involved determining how the law affected 
employment and wages across sectors and provinces. These questions were answered 
in chapter 4 using difference-in-difference models adapted from Bhorat et al. (2013). 
The first specification considered the law’s effect on the probability of employment in 
relevant sectors and the second version of the model was estimated with the dependent 
variable being the log of wages (deflated at the 2008 CPI) for the control and treatment 
groups. The models also considered the variation across district councils in the intensity 
of the law, which was based on the initial wage of workers in the pre-law period.  
The results from the employment probability models showed that there was an overall 
decreased likelihood of employment in the domestic and security sectors, for Western 
Cape. The two specifications of the probability of employment model, for the KwaZulu-
Natal found a positive and negative employment effect due to the law, whereas a 
negative effect was found for the security sector. In addition to this, only the security 
sector in Gauteng experienced a negative effect on the probability of employment, with 
no significant effect for the other two sectors. KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng saw 
significant increases in real wages between periods, for the domestic sector, while wage 
distributions for this sector was unchanged in the Western Cape. Western Cape retail 
workers felt an increase in real wages but a negative effect in KwaZulu-Natal and no 
significant change in Gauteng. The security sector in KwaZulu-Natal faced higher real 
wages, whereas a lower wage effect was found in Gauteng and no significant change in 
wages for Western Cape. Overall, an ambiguous domestic worker employment effect is 
found for KwaZulu-Natal however, a negative effect for Western Cape is found, but a 
positive wage effect for KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng. This positive wage effect may be 
linked to the large increase in compliance from employers. The retail sector did not 
experience a significant change in employment probabilities for all three sectors, 
although a positive and negative effect on wages was found for Western Cape and 
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KwaZulu-Natal respectively. Estimates of non-compliance for this sector in Western 
Cape and Gauteng did not experience a large decrease, as found in KwaZulu-Natal. 
The law seemed to have decreased employment prospects in the security sector for 
those situated in the three provinces of analysis. In contrast, KwaZulu-Natal security 
workers experienced a positive wage effect whereas Gauteng security workers 
experienced a negative wage effect. However, this being said, non-compliance for this 
sector, across all three provinces is high. It is apparent from the estimated results that 
the law has different effects in different provinces, which therefore provides support for 
the analysis of minimum wage effects at the provincial level.  
Previous literature provides no conclusive explanation for the causes of the high 
unemployment and income inequality in the South African economy. Each sector that is 
covered by the law is unique, and thus further research should be undertaken to 
examine patterns in employment and wages at a provincial level so that a deeper 
understanding can be achieved of the provincial effects of the law. In addition, not 
enough research has been done on the issue of compliance to the law, which is critical 
to for the law to achieve its desired objectives. Therefore, more research is also 
required in this area, particularly on the determinants of enforcement and how these 
may differ by region. Based on the results of the recommended research, it will be vital 
to develop an integrated approach relating existing programmes and policies to promote 
employment and appropriate wage structures to measures of compliance. 
Recently, trade unions have called for a national minimum wage and during the state of 
the nation address in June 2014; President Jacob Zuma stated that the government will 
explore the possibility of a national minimum wage as a key mechanism to decrease 
income inequality (Coleman, 2014; Zuma, 2014). Minimum wage policy in South Africa 
is put in place to battle the challenges of unemployment, poverty and income inequality 
(Darroll, 2014). Therefore research in this field regarding the role of minimum wage is of 
great help in supporting or opposing the trade union views. An enforceable and 
mandated national minimum wage would form a wage floor that does not allow for 
wages in any sector to fall below this level, and thus eliminates possible spill-over 
effects between covered and uncovered sectors or areas. However, a national minimum 
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wage set at a higher level than the current sectoral minimum would probably lead to job 
destruction, mainly in the tradable sectors, with the outcome that poverty may be 
greater than before the sectoral minimum wage (Seekings and Nattrass, 2015). 
Finn (2015) explored the potential effects of a national minimum wage and found that 
approximately one third of workers would be covered by this new law if it was set at 
R2 500 per month and two thirds of workers would be covered if it was set at R5 000 
per month. The national minimum wage would affect the various sectors in different 
ways, with the most sensitive sectors being the domestic and agricultural sectors. 
However, sectors such as mining and utilities would experience a minimal percentage of 
workers who would be affected by the law (Finn, 2015). 
The majority of the law-covered sectors are non-tradable sectors, i.e. sectors (such as 
private security, domestic work, and retail) which do not compete with imports. This 
lowers the chance that wage increases would lead to large employment losses 
(Seekings and Nattrass, 2015). In contrast, tradable sectors, such as agriculture, 
evidence points to competition with other global agricultural sectors. Empirical studies 
produced in different parts of the country (Conradie 2007; Murray and van Walbeek 
2007), which analysed national sectoral data, suggest that the first (2002) agricultural 
minimum wage increased wages reasonably and bettered compliance with wage 
regulations but also caused significant decline in employment and/or hours worked 
(Bhorat et al, 2012b).  
From this dissertation and previous research, it seems that the ECC’s sectoral 
determinations in the early 2000s in non-tradable sectors, in different provinces, 
resulted in higher real wages and as a result, the working poor were less poor. An 
essential point is that the effects of higher minimum wages differ among sectors 
according to aspects such as their international competition exposure, the potential of 
mechanisation, and the incomes of employers or customers. In other words, there is 
more scope for higher minimum wages in some sectors and provinces, than in others 
(Seekings and Nattrass, 2015). This implies that minimum wages should vary between 
sectors and provinces.  
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Minimum wages, at current, are one of the most complex policies pursued by the South 
African policymakers. Assessing their effects requires careful and in depth analysis of 
the labour market (Finn, 2015). Given the large geographical variation in the nature of 
the South African labour market, it is unlikely that legislation can be equally effectively 
implemented and monitored nation-wide, or that its effects would be identically 
beneficial everywhere. Therefore, in conclusion, research that allows for provincial or 
other spatial variation in the effects of the minimum wage and other such laws is key, in 
order to determine the appropriate labour policy for South Africa. 
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